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Abstract
Blockchain technology has its origins in the financial industry, but also other areas of application
are currently being investigated by many sides. One potential application field is the manufacturing
industry. The immutability of once stored data makes blockchains interesting for the storage of
various kinds of production data. For this purpose, a secure way from a production machine into a
blockchain has to be ensured. It may not happen that data can be manipulated before becoming part
of the immutable ledger. Currently used gateway solutions often run on general purpose computers,
communicate with a production machine and simultaneously operate a blockchain client. Attacks
on such gateways pose severe risks to the integrity of the measured data. This work focuses on the
conception of a more secure way for saving data into a blockchain. The goal is the creation of a
concept using hardware-near components and a prototypical implementation of it. The resulting
prototype should enable both the collection of data and the transport of said data into a blockchain.
At the same time, the use of lower level hardware in comparison to gateway solutions should reduce
potential attack vectors.
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Kurzfassung
Die Ursprünge der Blockchain Technologie finden sich in der Finanzindustrie, doch auch andere
Anwendungsbereichewerden derzeit von vielen Seiten untersucht. EinmöglichesAnwendungsgebiet
ist die Fertigungsindustrie. Die Unveränderlichkeit einmal gespeicherter Daten macht Blockchains
für die Speicherung verschiedener Arten von Produktionsdaten interessant. Für diesen Zweck muss
ein sichererWeg von einer Produktionsmaschine hinein in eine Blockchain gewährleistet sein. Es darf
nicht passieren, dass Datenmanipuliert werden können, bevor sie Teil des unveränderlichen Speichers
werden. Die gegenwärtig verwendeten Gateway Lösungen laufen häufig auf Universalcomputern,
kommunizieren mit einer Produktionsmaschine und betreiben gleichzeitig einen Blockchain Client.
Angriffe auf solche Gateways bergen schwerwiegende Risiken für die Integrität der gemessenen
Daten. Diese Arbeit konzentriert sich auf die Konzeption eines sichererenWeges zum Speichern von
Daten in eine Blockchain. Ziel ist die Erstellung eines Konzepts, das hardwarenahe Komponenten
nutzt, sowie eine prototypische Implementierung desselben. Der entstehende Prototyp sollte sowohl
das Sammeln von Daten als auch den Transport dieser Daten in eine Blockchain ermöglichen.
Gleichzeitig sollte die Verwendung einer Hardware, die einfacher ist verglichen mit der von Gateway
Lösungen, mögliche Angriffsvektoren reduzieren.
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1 Introduction
This chapter explains the motivation behind the work. Derived from this motivation, the scope of
work is presented. Finally, an overview on the structure of the thesis is given.
1.1 Motivation
With the upcoming of what is generally referred to as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” [Sch17],
the image of production machines has drastically changed. They are no longer centrally controlled
and run in isolation. Instead, production systems have become distributed and interconnected
cyber-physical systems. This means that both software components and hardware like actuators or
sensors share common data infrastructure and thereby communicate with each other.
Simultaneously, the blockchain technology is on the rise and it is observed with great interest from
different perspectives. Though originally mainly applied in the financial world, the fundamental
technology underlying blockchains is promising for various other fields of application, e.g. also
for intertwined production systems [Swa15]. What makes blockchains so interesting for industrial
applications is one of their main features: the immutability of recorded data. Once data was added
to a blockchain, it cannot easily be deleted or altered. Through this property, production data can be
immutably stored and also a proof for product quality can be made transparent.
Yet, the immutability of stored data requires for a secure path beginning from data acquisition and
ending with the successful storage inside a blockchain. If there is the danger of data being altered
on this path, the risk of manipulated data getting immutably stored arises.
At this time, there already exist a variety of interconnections between production machines and
blockchain instances [GPM17]. Many of them are solutions using a gateway. Such a gateway is
usually a software that is run on a general purpose computer. The gateway is connected to both the
production machine and a blockchain instance. This blockchain connection is achieved by running
a blockchain client which communicates with other clients via the Internet.
While such gateway solutions offer fast and easy data processing aswell as blockchain communication,
they can also be targets for attackers. If a general purpose computer is connected to the Internet,
this opens a variety of attack vectors. The way from the production machine to the gateway creates
further possibilities for attacks, namely manipulation of the measured data.
It is therefore necessary to explore newways of enablingmachines to communicate with a blockchain,
while simultaneously reducing potential attack vectors.
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1.2 Scope of Work
The goal of this work is the development of a concept for achieving storage of production data
within a blockchain. This concept has to be a hardware-near system architecture. This means that it
should not be a concept suitable for a general purpose computer, but a more low-level hardware.
Before that, existing approaches and technologies for communication between data sources and
blockchains have to be analyzed and weak points identified.
Taking these results into account, an appropriate system architecture has to be developed. The
design then has to be prototypically implemented in order to verify its practicability. The resulting
prototype has to be able to both collect data directly and store it in a blockchain instance, while
offering a higher security level than usual gateway solutions.
In addition to analyzing existing concepts, developing and implementing an own one, there also has
to be a discussion on blockchain finality, i.e. when can a transaction be considered immutable. As a
result, an approach to measure the degree of trust that data is durably stored within a blockchain has
to be found.
1.3 Document Structure
The work is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 – Fundamentals: This chapter gives an overview on the prerequisites necessary to
grasp the work. This comprises a definition and description of blockchains, their usage and
underlying concepts such as hashing or asymmetrical encryption. Furthermore, different
implementations will be presented and the application areas as well as shortcomings for
industrial applications are discussed.
Chapter 3 – Conception: Here, the different requirements that are posed on this work’s result are
given. Choices in terms of software and hardware technology are discussed and important
concepts for the generation of valid transactions in the chosen implementation are presented.
Resulting from these observations, two system architecture approaches are developed and the
better suited one is chosen for implementation.
Chapter 4 – Prototypical Implementation: In this chapter, the chosen system architecture is
prototypically implemented as a proof of concept. The different components of the design as
well as the program’s structure are explained.
Chapter 5 – General Blockchain Security Aspects: Possible security issues inherent in
blockchains are presented here. Afterwards, an approach for a metric measuring the
chance of a transaction becoming immutable is designed.
Chapter 6 – Evaluation: This chapter evaluates both the design and the implementation in form
of the prototype. Code execution timings and output will be analyzed and a comparison with
the requirements shown earlier is made here.
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Chapter 7 – Summary & Future Work: The final chapter wraps up the work and summarizes its
results. Finally, an outlook on possible future work is given.
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2 Fundamentals
This chapter gives an overview on blockchain technology in general and different implementations
of it. Furthermore, actual projects using a blockchain structure are discussed.
2.1 Blockchain Technology
In this section, the history and also a definition of blockchains is introduced. The features of
different blockchain concepts are discussed as well as their relation to cryptocurrencies.
2.1.1 History and Definition
In order to fully grasp the concept of the whole blockchain technology, one must first define the
term itself. Up to now, there is no strict definition of what a blockchain is, what belongs to it and
what does not [Mat16]. Though the term itself does not appear in his paper, Satoshi Nakamoto is
often credited the invention of blockchain technology [Nak08]. In his paper called “Bitcoin: A
Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” from the year 2008, he describes how blocks of data could
be organized in a chain where one block always references its predecessor. The author uses the
concept of chained data blocks as the foundation for a decentralized and purely virtual currency.
Later, the first cryptocurrency “Bitcoin” emerged from this idea.
In fact, the basic blockchain idea reaches even further in the past. In the year 1991, S. Haber and W.
Scott Stornetta described how digital signatures and time stamps for various kinds of documents
could be created by the use of hash functions. Furthermore, they propose to link the different data
for verification purposes [HS91].
A few years later, R. J. Anderson described a data storage concept called “The Eternity Service”.
The author suggests to store data decentralized all over the globe. That way, information cannot be
easily destroyed or kept under tight wraps by government regulations [And96].
This work follows the general and widely accepted definition of a blockchain: different data blocks
are generated and linked with the use of hash functions and cryptography. The result is a chain
of blocks where each block depends on its predecessor, thereby also creating a time consistency
throughout the blockchain.
More precisely, a block consists of several transactions and a header. The transactions represent the
data that is to be stored within a block. The header consists of two hash values: the hash value
of the previous block header and the hash value calculated from the current block’s transactions.
Figure 2.1 shows a simplified illustration of such a blockchain structure.
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Figure 2.1: Simplified illustration of a blockchain structure [Nak08]
In the last few years, the success and growing prominence of Bitcoin drew more and more attention
to its underlying and at this time innovative blockchain concept. This led to the development
of additional cryptocurrencies, most of which use some variation of the original blockchain
technology.
2.1.2 Blockchains in Cryptocurrencies
The core element of a cryptocurrency are tokens which can be sent from one user to another, like a
real currency, e.g. the US-Dollar.
More specifically, the tokens are sent from one address to another. An address is either calculated
from the public key of an asymmetrical cryptographic key pair or it is the public key itself. Such a
key pair consists of two parts, a public and a private key.
As mentioned above, the address that a user can send coins to is related to the public key. The key is
called “public” because itself or the derived address should be known by other parties who want
to send funds to it. To each public key, there belongs exactly one private key. More precisely, a
public key is calculated via a cryptographic function from the private key. The private key allows
the address owner to access coins that were sent to the respective public key. Therefore, the private
key is to be kept secret by the user who owns it.
The keys as well as signatures in many cryptocurrencies are created via a cryptographic process
called Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The basic algorithm was proposed
back in 1999 [JM99] and combines the classic Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [Nat13] with
elliptic curve cryptography.
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Figure 2.2: Signing transaction data with asymmetrical cryptography
The main feature of asymmetrical cryptography is the following: it is easy to verify that data was
encrypted with a private key belonging to a certain public key. On the other hand, the public key
itself does not give away any information about the corresponding private key. This means that it
is an extremely hard mathematical problem to calculate a secret private key from a known public
key.
In order to send coins from one address to another, a transaction is executed. The transaction states
how many coins are sent from which sending address to which receiving address. For reasons of
authentication, the issuer of a transaction signs the transaction with its private key. This is where
ECDSA comes into play. Signing means creating a digital signature of some data with the use of a
private key via a cryptographic function. The transaction data (or rather a hash of it) gets signed
with the private key, resulting in a digital signature. This signature gets added to the original data
and the signed transaction can then be issued. This process is pictured in Figure 2.2.
Receiving parties can now easily verify the authenticity of the sender. Therefore, they first decrypt
the signature with the senders public key. The result of this operation is the hash value of the initial
transaction data. Then the verifying parties just have to hash the transaction data they received and
compare the obtained hash with the hash from the decrypted signature. If the two hashes match, the
integrity of the data and the authenticity of the sender are proven.
The decryption process is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Transaction data signature verification with asymmetrical cryptography
With the use of an asymmetrical encryption method for signature generation, the following three
properties are ensured [SSUF16]:
• The transaction was issued by the person that was in possession of the private key, i.e. the
owner of the coins
• It is not possible to change the transaction once it was sent
• The sender cannot deny the intention of actually wanting this transaction to be executed
In a cryptocurrency context, the blockchain is a ledger where every transaction that was ever
made is stored in. Yet, the blockchain itself does not directly store how many coins are held by
which address. But by containing a complete list of each transaction, the current state of the token
distribution can be calculated at any arbitrary point in the past and at present [Ant14].
2.1.3 Distinctions and Features of Blockchains
Abstracting from the financial aspect, the blockchain itself is nothing more than a data structure,
comparable to a classic database.
A first distinction of different kinds of blockchains can be made by considering them permissioned
or permissionless. A permissioned blockchain only allows access to a certain group of users, e.g.
when it is a blockchain used within a company only by the company’s employees, or if several
companies work together on a shared blockchain.
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Permissionless blockchains on the other hand allow access and participation to everyone [Bit15].
Every user who follows the given protocol can interact with the blockchain, and all users have the
same rights.
Another distinction that resembles the one in permissioned and permissionless is public and private
blockchains. Public blockchains can be used by anyone willing to do so, private blockchains restrict
their userbase according to certain regulations.
A key feature of any blockchain is decentralization. A decentralized blockchain consists of many
nodes where every node runs an own blockchain client [PP15]. This corresponds to a peer-to-peer
(P2P) network [MKL+02]. Each node stores a version of the blockchain. The nodes communicate
with each other and try to reach consensus over the current valid state. That way, no centralized
authority is needed to verify the validity of the current blockchain.
A decentralized blockchain is resistant to failures of single nodes. As it is always the majority of
active nodes that decides the current blockchain state, it is irrelevant whether single nodes fail.
More importantly, it is also resistant to manipulation enforced by a corrupt node. The corresponding
mathematical problem is known as the “Byzantine Generals Problem” described by Lamport et al.
[LSP82].
In the original problem, a group of Byzantine generals communicate with each other to coordinate
an attack on a city. They all have to agree on a certain maneuver, but some of the generals
might be traitors trying to sabotage consensus or even create a bad consensus due to manipulated
information.
This problem resembles the problem of independent nodes reaching consensus over the current
blockchain state. One of the solutions that is used in many blockchain implementations is the
following: The “correct” version of the blockchain is always the longest chain [Zoh15]. This makes
sense if the creation of new blocks follows the Proof of Work (PoW) principle. That means that a
mathematical problem has to be solved via guessing the correct solution in order to add a new block
containing recent transactions to the blockchain. As it is a hard problem, a fair amount of time
and especially computational power is needed to solve it. Thus, the longest chain is the one where
the most computational effort was put it and thereby also the one that is least likely to have been
manipulated by an attacker. The people trying to solve this PoW puzzle are called miners. They get
rewarded with newly created tokens whenever they are the first to discover a new block.
Apart from the PoW consensus mechanism, there exist many other mechanisms with their respective
advantages and disadvantages. Several of them are presented in the following:
• Proof of Stake (PoS)
This consensus mechanism considers a user’s stake, i.e. the amount of tokens held by an
address, in order to determine the creator of a new block. The user adding a new block is
usually chosen randomly, but the higher a user’s stake, the higher is also the probability that
the user’s block is chosen [Nxt14]. There are different variants, e.g. also taking into account
how long an address already possesses the tokens [KN12].
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• Proof of Activity
Proof of Activity combines both PoW and PoS mechanisms [BLMR14] [TS16]. First, an
empty block, i.e. a block without transactions in it, is mined in a PoW manner. When it is
found, a certain amount of stakeholders are chosen. Each of these stakeholders must sign the
block with their respective private keys. The higher a user’s stake is, the higher the probability
to get chosen as one of the signatories. This is the PoS component. If one of the signatories
is offline, i.e. the block does not get signed within a certain period of time, a new set of
stakeholders is chosen. This means that inactive users are left out of the block generation
process. Hence the name, Proof of Activity. The transaction fees are split between the one
discovering the block and the signatories.
• Proof of Authority
Another consensus algorithm is the Proof of Authority [Par18]. Here, a set of trustworthy
authorities is chosen beforehand. Only they have the right to create new blocks, and the
majority of these authorities must agree upon a created block. This concept is rather likely to
be used in private blockchains.
The advantages and disadvantages of the different presented consensus mechanisms are discussed
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparison of different consensus algorithms
Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages
Proof of Work + Rewards distributed in fair manner
relative to computational power
+ High block generation rewards en-
courage mining
- Low transaction throughput
- High energy consumption
- Rewards get smaller over time,
might drive away miners
Proof of Stake + Low energy consumption
+ No new tokens have to be issued
upon block creation
+ Transaction scalability
- Wealthy parties decide over net-
work and get richer
- Hoarding instead of spending to-
kens is encouraged
Proof of Activity + Active users are rewarded
+Attacker needs both computational
power and stake
- Combines disadvantages of PoW
and PoS
Proof of Authority + High transaction throughput
+ Fast
+ Cheap in terms of computational
power
- Blockchain gets centralized in the
hands of few
- Problem how to determine trust-
worthy authorities
After a certain number of blocks are appended to a specific block, the transactions in said block
can be considered as safe [BMC+15]. The amount of necessary blocks heavily depends on the
respective implementation.
In conclusion, the most important features of any blockchain are:
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• Decentralization via multiple nodes that form some sort of P2P network
• Resistance to failure or manipulation of single nodes
• Immutability of data that was once successfully added into the blockchain
2.2 Different Blockchain Implementations
In the following, several implementations of blockchains and the differences between them are
investigated.
2.2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the oldest and probably best known implementation of a blockchain [Nak08].
It is a decentralized blockchain which is used as a digital currency system. There are several
thousand nodes participating in the P2P network all over the world [Bit18c]. As already described
in Section 2.1.2, Bitcoin uses asymmetrical encryption for generating addresses, i.e. public keys,
and private keys that allow a user to send funds from an address. A public key always starts with
either a 1 or a 3 and has a length between 26-35 characters [Bit18a]. The private keys are 256 Bit
numbers, which equals to 64 hexadecimal digits.
Transactions are often performed by the use of a wallet application. This application saves the
private and public key and performs all the necessary steps to satisfy the Bitcoin transaction protocol.
In order to perform a transaction, the sender only needs to know the address of the recipient [Fra15].
The transaction steps are as follows [Ant14]:
First, unspent incoming transactions of the sender have to be found. As the blockchain only stores
transactions, the difference between incoming and outgoing Bitcoins determines the current balance
of an address. If one or more yet unspent transactions that equal or surpass the new transaction’s
value are available, the wallet can begin to build up the transaction. Therefore, a stack-based, not
Turing-complete scripting language is used [Fra15]. The wallet creates a script that contains one or
more previous incoming and unspent transactions, as well as a signature generated with the sender’s
private key, to verify the possession of the Bitcoins. As an output, the sender specifies one or more
addresses and also the amount of tokens that is to be sent to each address. For a valid transaction,
the sum of Bitcoins of incoming transactions must be greater or equal to the sum of Bitcoins of the
outgoing transactions.
Because incoming transactions are always fully used up, the sender can specify its own address as a
receiving address in order to send resulting change back to itself. The difference between incoming
and outgoing Bitcoins is used as a transaction fee, which will be explained later.
In order to access the funds within a transaction, the receiver also creates a script. This script
contains a signature created with the receiver’s private key.
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The two scripts are being concatenated and run sequentially. If the script evaluates to “True”, the
transaction can be considered completed.
Before the receiver can try to solve the sender’s script, the transaction must be added to the
blockchain. In order to achieve this, the transaction is first sent to a network node. Each transaction
has a unique ID. As the network nodes form a P2P network, the unexecuted transaction is propagated
through the network to other nodes. It is now in the “mempool”, which is a term for the set of
issued but not yet executed transactions. Transactions from the mempool can be appended to the
blockchain via a process called “mining”.
A mining node takes transactions from the pool of not yet executed transactions and puts them
together in a block. Such a block contains a number representing its size, a block header, a
transaction counter for the amount of transactions included in the block, and the actual transactions’
data (which is by far the biggest part of each block’s size). The block header itself consists of
several elements, namely [Ant14]:
• A version number of the Bitcoin protocol that was used
• The hash of the previous block in the blockchain
• A hash of the Merkle-Tree root for the block’s transactions, which is a special encoding of all
the transaction hashes
• A timestamp of the blocks creation (created during the mining process)
• The difficulty target, i.e. a parameter for the PoW algorithm (created during the mining
process)
• A nonce used for the PoW algorithm (created during the mining process)
After putting together the required information, the miner tries to solve the PoW puzzle. The task is
to create a hash which has a value smaller than a certain target. The hashing algorithm is performed
multiple times with different nonces until a miner finds an appropriate hash. The miner is now
allowed to add the block to the blockchain and the result is again propagated to the other network
nodes.
The used hashing algorithm is SHA-256. Its output is always fixed-length and can be interpreted as
one big number. Though the amount of digits is always the same, it is not possible to determine the
size of the output number beforehand. So finding an appropriate block is based on pure luck. With
the difficulty target, adjustments can be made so a block is found approximately every 10 minutes,
independent of how many miners perform how many hashes.
The miner who is allowed to append a new block is rewarded with the fees of the block’s transactions
as well as a fixed amount of newly generated Bitcoins for each block. The amount of new Bitcoins
halves multiple times, the longer the blockchain gets. Because this is the only way how new Bitcoins
are generated, the total amount can never surpass 21 million Bitcoins.
Because miners may keep all the fees within their found block, it is a common approach for miners
to include transactions with higher fees first. This leads to the general assumption: the higher the
fees, the faster a transaction will be executed.
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Figure 2.4:Mining and sending transactions in the Bitcoin P2P network
Figure 2.4 shows the different roles of participants in the Bitcoin network. Sender, Receiver and
Miner in this figure can be active P2P network nodes, too, but they do not necessarily have to be.
This means that Bitcoin accounts and miners do not need to operate their own nodes. It is sufficient
for them to communicate with an active node, e.g. over a wallet or a website.
The Bitcoin blockchain is optimized to save space, as it grows larger with every transaction. That is
why it does not allow a user to store big amounts of data within it. In fact, there is no mechanism
intended to store arbitrary data at all. A transaction can have a description that both the sender
and the receiver see, though this data does not become part of the blockchain. Other ways of
storing data result from abuse of fields that accept user input. One way is sending a transaction to a
receiving address which consists of the data that is to be stored. This method allows the storage of
35 hexadecimal digits, i.e. 17 and a half bytes. Another way is the “OP_RETURN” script opcode
of the Bitcoin scripting language. It marks transaction outputs invalid and allows for the storage of
up to 80 bytes, though this is not a recommended procedure [Bit17]. All in all, storing arbitrary
data is not naturally supported and very expensive considering the transaction fees.
2.2.2 Ethereum
The Ethereum Project was developed after the potential and success of Bitcoin were proven. Many
of the concepts from Bitcoin were absorbed directly or slightly changed. In addition to transferring
tokens in a blockchain, the founder Vitalik Buterin also added a Turing-complete programming
language for smart contracts and decentralized applications (dApps) [But14]. Like in Bitcoin,
tokens named Ether (ETH) can be sent from one address to another. Addresses are either part of an
asymmetrical key pair, or, in contrast to Bitcoin, smart contract addresses.
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The concept of smart contracts was first introduced by Nick Szabo back in 1996 [Sza96]. He
describes how real world contracts about various things like property rights or liens could be
implemented into computer soft- or hardware. The goal why such contracts should be virtualized is
making them harder to be breached or manipulated.
In Ethereum, smart contracts are pieces of code which can be written in different programming
languages. The most prominent one is a programming language called Solidity, which was
exclusively developed for Ethereum [Sol16]. Each deployed smart contract has an own address
and is stored in the Ethereum blockchain. A runtime environment called the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) executes parts of the smart contract code whenever a transaction is sent to the
smart contract’s address. This can also result in the contract receiving or sending Ether.
The term dApp is used in the Ethereum context to describe an application which is written in a smart
contract and interacts with users [Git18a]. As the application’s code is stored in the blockchain, it is
per se decentralized. The Ethereum project distinguishes between three different types of dApps:
• Financial Applications
A dApp can create and issue its own tokens which are different from ETH, basically creating
its own currency. DApps could also be used to create saving accounts or manage wills. All
these application fields focus exclusively on the monetary aspect a dApp can have.
• Semi-financial Applications
This comprises dApps which have a financial aspect but also a real world reference. An
example would be dApps that send money to the first person solving a specific real world
problem.
• Non-financial Applications
The third and last category can be used for dApps that handle e.g. online voting or public
administration.
The transactions in the Ethereum network resemble the ones of Bitcoin, though there are some
slight differences. A transaction in Ethereum has a receiving address, the sender’s signature, an
amount of ETH to be sent (can be 0, e.g. when interacting with smart contracts), a data field where
arbitrary data can be put into, a gas limit and a gas price.
Gas is used to determine the transaction fee. Each computational step consumes 1 gas, and each
byte of transaction data costs another 5 gas. The user can specify a limit, how much gas should not
be exceeded by the transaction. If the gas limit is reached, the transaction fails.
The gas price is usually given in “wei”, which is a fraction of ETH. One wei is equivalent to 10-18
ETH. The gas limit multiplied with the price per gas used determines the maximum fee that a user
is willing to pay for a transaction.
The idea behind this concept is preventing users from spamming and clogging the network with
unnecessary transactions or huge data blocks. The fees are a reward for the miner who finds the
block where the transactions were put into. Like in Bitcoin, the only way of generating new ETH, in
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addition to the amount that was issued initially, is the mining reward. Currently, a miner is rewarded
3 newly generated ETH for each new block. This reward was and will be reduced further to cap the
amount of maximum ETH circulating.
The PoW algorithm in Ethereum is called Ethash [Eth16][Git17a]. The goal is once again to
produce a hash that is smaller than a certain target. The hash is generated on a subset of a big
directed acyclic graph (DAG) which changes every 30,000 blocks. As the average time between the
finding of two blocks is about 12 seconds, the DAG gets recreated every 100 hours [Git18e]. The
used hashing algorithm is a variant of the SHA-3 standard which is called Keccak-256.
In the future, the consensus algorithm will change from PoW to PoS. In Ethereum’s proposal of a
PoS algorithm, consensus is reached by the participants voting for the valid blockchain and their
votes get weighted with the amount of ETH that a participant owns. This process would completely
substitute the regular PoW-based mining [Git18f]. The idea behind this procedure is to reduce
electricity costs, hinder centralization and mitigate the token inflation.
2.2.3 Hyperledger
Hyperledger was started at the end of 2015 by the Linux foundation [Lin15]. In the meantime,
multiple companies joined the project to collaboratively work on the development of open source
blockchains. Hyperledger aims for a broad variety of application fields, e.g. manufacturing,
banking or Internet of Things (IoT). Therefore, it provides several permissioned blockchain
implementations.
What it offers is a modular architectural framework that all Hyperledger projects are built on. The
modular components comprise [Hyp17]:
• A Consensus Layer
Defines how agreement on blocks and transactions is reached.
• A Smart Contract Layer
Executes business logic embedded in smart contracts.
• Communication Layer
Handles the message transport between the participating nodes.
• Data Store Abstraction
Allows different data stores to be used by other modules.
• Crypto Abstraction
Defines and abstracts the crypto algorithms that are used.
• Identity Services
Provides authentication, authorization and handles network identities.
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• Policy Services
Handle policies, e.g. for endorsement, consensus or group management.
• APIs
Defines interfaces for applications and clients to interact with the blockchain.
• Interoperation
Supports the interoperation between different blockchain instances.
Several implementations of blockchain frameworks have been published since the start ofHyperledger.
Each project puts an emphasis on different blockchain aspects. Hyperledger Iroha focuses on
mobile application development [Sor18], while Hyperledger Indy has its main advantage in identity
management [Git18c].
Another prominent project in this environment is Hyperledger Fabric [Hyp18a]. It is a platform for
distributed ledger solutions that looks at blockchains more as data structures and not as a foundation
for token-based cryptocurrency applications. Like other Hyperledger projects, it also supports
smart contracts (here called “chaincode”) and the key mechanism are transactions sent from one
participant to another. The architecture is modular so that different components can be replaced or
interchanged.
One of the main differences to the other presented blockchain implementations is the fact that it is
private and permissioned [ABB+18]. Therefore, only trustedmembers that were previously approved
may participate in a Hyperledger Fabric instance. This shows that small groups like companies
that share a production process are the targeted audience. Business-to-business (B2B) blockchain
designs demand special requirements that differ from those of public distributed ledgers.
Some of those key features that Hyperledger Fabric focuses on are identity management, privacy
and a modular design.
The blockchain itself consists of two elements: The first is a so called “world state” which is
a representation of the blockchain’s state at a certain point in time. The second element is the
“transaction log” which stores all performed transactions. The world state is therefore the result of
all executions of transactions in the transaction log up to a fixed point in time.
Hyperledger Fabric supports transactions in multiple channels, and each channel has its own
blockchain and privacy management. A dataset in the blockchain is represented by a key-value pair
that can either be created, updated or deleted.
The nodes participating in a Hyperledger Fabric instance can be distinguished into three different
categories:
• (submitting-)Clients
This is the entity that an end-user runs in order to issue transactions. For communicating
with the blockchain, a client must be connected to a peer.
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• Peers
These nodes maintain copies of the ledger and execute transactions on them. They can also
have an endorsing functionality. Every chaincode has an endorsement policy which specifies
which peers have to endorse transactions in which way. Only if the endorsement policy gets
fulfilled, the corresponding transaction is executed.
• Ordering Service Nodes
These nodes provide a shared communication channel between peers and clients within a
channel. They are also responsible for reaching consensus in a blockchain instance as they
order transactions and put them together into blocks.
As there is no native currency that gets sent between users, the core element of interaction is defined
in the chaincode. Each channel that multiple peers share with each other has to define functions for
interaction. Such a function could e.g. define trading two goods for each other.
Let’s assume that both trading parties have a client connected to a network peer, a channel set
up between these peers and they have both verified their respective identity and authenticated to
the network. The two peers are the only ones connected via the used channel and they both have
to endorse each transaction. The steps of a transaction then look as follows [Hyp18b], with a
visualization given in Figure 2.5.
1. Transaction Initiation and Proposal
One client initiates a transaction via the peer it is connected to. As a result of the transaction,
some part of the chaincode has to be invoked. The initiator’s request gets built, signed and
sent to both endorsing peers as a proposal.
2. Signature Verification and Transaction Execution Proposal
Both peers have to verify that the transaction proposal is well-formed and that it has not
been submitted at some point in the past. Additionally, they have to verify the validity of the
signature and the authorization of the initiator. If these steps are successful, the addressed
chaincode gets executed with the passed arguments and a proposal for a result is created. At
this point, no change to the ledger’s state has occurred yet.
3. Proposal Inspection
The two parties’ proposed results are compared by the initiator. If they are the same and the
transaction would result in a change of the ledger state, the transaction has to be forwarded to
an Ordering Service. This is also done by the initiating client.
4. Building of Transaction
The Ordering Service receives a transaction message containing the datasets that have to
be read or written as well as the signature of the endorsing peers. The Ordering Service
then orders all the transactions it received in the corresponding channel and creates blocks
containing the transactions of the channel.
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Figure 2.5: Steps of a transaction in Hyperledger Fabric
5. Transaction Validation and Execution
All peers in the channel receive the blocks constructed by the Ordering Service. The requested
ledger updates are again checked before the final execution. If this check is successful, the
transaction is tagged as being valid.
6. Ledger Update
As a last step, each peer updates its copy of the ledger by executing the transaction. Afterwards,
the client which issued the transaction gets informed that the transaction was successfully
executed.
In contrast to other blockchain implementations, there exists not one certain consensus algorithm
in Hyperledger Fabric. Consensus is rather reached over multiple steps performed by different
parties. Each authentication and signature generation along this way can be considered a part of the
consensus algorithm. The pure act of constructing blocks though is performed by the Ordering
Service nodes.
2.2.4 IOTA
The fourth and last presented distributed ledger technology is IOTA. It was released in 2016 and is
currently under the control of the IOTA Foundation [The18b]. Alike Ethereum and Bitcoin, the
distributed ledger is permissionless and open source. The main field of application differs though.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of a classic blockchain with the IOTA tangle
IOTA targets machine-to-machine (M2M) transactions in an IoT environment [Pop17]. Therefore
exists a currency within the ledger which is also called IOTA. As the total amount of IOTA tokens
is over 2.7 quadrillion, the token is often referred to as MIOTA, which means 106 IOTA.
The feature where IOTA most differs from the already presented distributed ledgers is the data
structure itself. Instead of a linear blockchain where each block contains the hash of its predecessor,
IOTA uses a DAG for connecting single transactions. This DAG is called “the tangle”. Like a
classic blockchain, the tangle holds all transactions that were ever issued in a chronological order.
Let us now further investigate how the tangle is being constructed: each transaction is represented
by a node in the graph. When a user issues a new transaction, this transaction must approve two
previous ones. For each approval, a directed edge gets added to the graph. The direction of the
edge is always from the approving transaction to the approved one. Every block further backwards
in such an approval path gets also approved by the new transaction. This is then called indirect
approval.
The structural difference between a classic blockchain and the tangle is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
While each block in a classic blockchain contains a multitude of transactions, the IOTA tangle holds
single transactions, each of which approves two previous transactions.
In the beginning there was one initial transaction called the “genesis transaction”. It held all the
tokens that would ever get distributed. This means that no new tokens will ever be created, and
consequently there is no process like mining new tokens. Instead of the classic PoW done by miners,
every transaction issuer must solve a PoW puzzle themselves in order for the transaction to get sent.
This once again prevents spamming the network with a multitude of transactions.
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In addition to solving the PoWpuzzle, a transaction issuer also has to verify two previous transactions.
When a conflict is discovered while approving a transaction, the approval should fail. If not, there
is the risk that the transaction approving an invalid one gets considered invalid by following
transactions, too.
It still happens that two conflicting transactions both get added to the tangle. The network participants
then have to decide which transaction is more likely to be valid. The other one then gets orphaned,
meaning it will not be indirectly approved by new transactions anymore.
A transaction is more likely to be valid, the higher its cumulative weight is. Each transaction
has a certain weight representing its importance. It is of course not possible for a single user to
create many transactions with high weight in a short period of time. The cumulative weight is the
weight of a transaction itself plus the weight of all transactions directly or indirectly approving a
transaction.
The concept of cumulative weight resembles the block confirmations in other blockchain implemen-
tations. The more transactions follow a certain transaction, the safer one can be that it is durably
stored.
As there is little PoW necessary to issue a transaction or to sign one, it is easy for an attacker to
manipulate the tangle state, as long as there is a low frequency of transactions and participating
nodes [IOT18]. Out of that reason, the IOTA Foundation decided to use a coordinator until the
network throughput gets high enough to resolve security issues. This coordinator signs every
transaction and stores its location in the tangle. Transactions cannot be considered successful until
referenced by the coordinator.
This basically makes the current tangle a centralized distributed ledger, as one party has the power
to decide which transactions get signed and can be deemed confirmed.
The developers claim that IOTA enables almost instant and feeless transactions. Also, in contrast to
classic blockchains, the more transactions are issued, the faster other transactions get verified.
2.3 Blockchains in the Industry
The potential application fields of blockchain technology in the industrial context are numerous. In
the following, a few exemplary concepts are presented. Afterwards, reasons and challenges for an
industrial blockchain adoption are discussed.
2.3.1 Industrial Application Examples
Three industrial applications where the use of blockchains is discussed or even already implemented
are presented in this section.
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Machine-to-Machine Electricity Market
Sikorski et al. propose the use of blockchain technology in the electricity market forM2M interaction
[SHK17]. The idea is that electricity producers publish their offers, i.e. how much a consumer
currently has to pay for a certain amount of electric energy. The consumer can observe and compare
different offers and choose the cheapest or generally best fitting electricity provider. Both the offer
and the consumer’s purchase process take place in a blockchain. The participants have to lock their
trading goods, i.e. the electricity provider guarantees the delivery of the offered amount of energy,
and the consumer ensures the possession of the required amount of money to pay for it.
The benefit of this model is the fact that no human interaction is needed in the whole process.
Consumingmachines can specify their energy demand and take care of their power supply themselves.
The machine of the electricity provider on the other hand can produce the energy on demand.
The blockchain is used here both for automation of the trading process and as a trustful intermediary,
as it guarantees both sides that the trading goods actually exist.
Construction Engineering Management
Another application field proposed by Wang et al. is the use of blockchains in construction
engineering management [WWWS17]. They identify three different categories.
The first are notarization-related applications. The need to have a notary verify the validity and
integrity of documents is expensive and time-consuming. By using a distributed ledger to track
every document creation, update and deletion, the blockchain could replace a notary in some specific
points.
A further category are transaction-related applications. If the ownership of goods is controlled by
the blockchain, a lot of trades can be automated. This can comprise tangible goods like building
materials or construction machines or even intangible goods, e.g. the transfer of certain technology
or knowledge.
The third and last identified category is provenance-related applications. As all the supply chains
of a construction project would become transparent, it is easy to check if quality standards were
fulfilled. If material-related problems arise during the construction, responsible parties can be
identified and made accountable.
As an exemplary use case, a process for leasing construction cranes based on a Hyperledger
blockchain instance is introduced. In this prototypical blockchain, a crane manufacturer can
register a new crane in the blockchain which is then offered for lease to a customer. Therefore,
the manufacturer invokes a certain piece of chaincode that creates a record for the new crane.
Afterwards, a customer can lease the crane via another piece of chaincode for a certain period of
time. If the customer’s payment is verified, the crane can be used by the customer for construction
works. During the lease period, the customer updates the operational status of the crane once again
on the blockchain. This data, e.g. breakdown events, electricity consumption or daily lifting load,
updates the crane record.
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Like in the previous concept, the blockchain is used here mainly to automate steps that would
normally require human interaction. Additionally, the blockchain’s immutability is used for property
rights and document validity.
3D Printing Supply Chain
Blechschmidt et al. describe how to improve the manufacturing industry by the use of blockchain
technology [BS16]. They state that the cost overhead in 3D printing supply chains could be reduced
if producers and customers both collaboratively used a blockchain. Therefore, they brought into
being a project called “Genesis of Things” [The18a]. Their platform connects owners of 3D printers,
customers who need parts printed as a service and designers of 3D parts.
The creator of a 3D design file which can be printed uploads the encrypted design to the blockchain.
A customer can now decide to buy a certain amount of the product. Via smart contracts, the
pricing as well as other terms and conditions are negotiated between the three parties automatically.
Additionally, the best fitting 3D printer in terms of price and local proximity gets chosen. Each
product is assigned a unique ID and its whole production history is made transparent via blockchain
records.
The design file creator gets a royalty each time a design is printed. The owner of the printer gets paid
for every print job. The customer can find the nearest and cheapest 3D printer for the production of
otherwise costly spare parts or small series products.
As a proof of concept, cufflinks made of titanium were designed and the 3D printing file was
uploaded to the blockchain. Along with the design itself, meta-information like used material are
stored as well. A customer can then order any amount of cufflinks produced on demand with the
already uploaded design. Each item gets a serial number and, through the transparency of the
production process, also a digital product memory.
2.3.2 Remarks on Current Solutions
The exemplary solutions proposing or even actually using blockchains in an industrial context show
certain advantages, but also challenges.
Benefits of Blockchain Adoption
Although many of them are just prototypical suggestions, a lot of use cases exist for the application
of blockchains in various industrial fields. The main reasons why these applications try to use
blockchain technology are automation and a need for trust. If several parties interact with each other
and do not know each other, or even worse, do not trust each other, a blockchain can facilitate this
interaction. Together with smart contracts, the technology offers transparency, automated execution
of previously defined actions and resistance to manipulation by single participants.
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Figure 2.7: Attack vectors on blockchain gateway solutions
When multiple parties work together on a blockchain-based platform, they can form a so called
decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). The rules of interaction between the members of a
DAO are written in computer code, i.e. smart contracts define the business structure [Cho17]. That
way, the need for a neutral but also costly intermediary is no longer present, as the blockchain can
fulfill this task.
A further important factor is the immutability of stored data. The decentralized blockchain structure
is resistant to both failure and manipulation of single nodes. Once data was successfully stored, it
cannot be deleted or altered as long as the majority of nodes does not agree.
Challenges
When considering blockchain technology within a manufacturing process, the integrity of data
must be ensured on the whole way from production machine to blockchain. Machine data obtained
e.g. by sensors must not be altered before reaching the blockchain [Sob17]. Otherwise, wrong or
manipulated data gets immutably stored, destroying the whole concept of trust.
Many of the existing prototypes use some kind of gateway between blockchain and production
machine [Ste17]. Such a gateway consists of a software that communicates with a production
machine, collects data and stores it in the blockchain. The software is run on a general purpose
computer, together with a full blockchain node. That way, both the production machine and the
blockchain interaction can be achieved by a single computer.
While this is the easiest way to connect a production machine to a blockchain, gateway solutions
can pose severe security risks. Possible attack vectors can be seen in Figure 2.7. On the way from
the production machine to the computer, the sent data could potentially be manipulated. That way,
measurement values could be involuntarily changed before reaching the blockchain. Further on, the
computer running the blockchain node and communicating with the production machine could be
attacked, too. The computer needs an Internet connection and therefore offers a variety of attack
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vectors. Every virus or malware running on the computer poses severe risks to the production
measurement process. If the collected data gets altered before a blockchain transaction is built up,
the integrity of the blockchain can then no longer be guaranteed.
That is why the concept of blockchains for production data only makes sense if a secure way from
the sensor measuring data to a finished blockchain transaction is ensured.
One way to reduce the described security risks is changing the gateway design. If instead of a
general purpose computer, a more primitive, single-purpose computer is used, this could potentially
increase the security of the whole system.
The goal of this work is to answer the question: is it possible to develop a concept that enables
communication with a blockchain without the necessity of a general purpose computer running a
blockchain client? In the following chapters, this topic will be further investigated.
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This chapter comprises the development of a concept for a secure transmission of production
data. Beforehand, requirements are presented and used technologies as well as functionalities are
introduced.
3.1 Requirements
In the following section a concept for data transmission between a production machine and a
blockchain will be developed. Therefore, one first needs to identify requirements that the design
has to meet.
3.1.1 General Requirements
• Use Appropriate Blockchain Implementation
As already stated in Section 2.2, a lot of different implementations based on blockchain
technology exist. As the underlying concepts differ from each other, a technology has to be
chosen that is best fitting for both the functional and non-functional requirements.
• Hardware-near Implementation
The developed prototypical component has to run on a platform that is close to hardware, so
it can both retrieve data from a production machine and send it to the blockchain.
• Direct Sensor Connection
Retrieving data has to be able without the need for an intermediary between a sensor or a
production machine and the prototype.
3.1.2 Functional Requirements
• Sending Data to the Blockchain
The component must be able to communicate with a blockchain. As transactions are the core
element of blockchain communication, the component must be able to issue transactions.
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• Permanent Storage
The designed prototype must be able to send production data to the blockchain which is
then put into a block and stored immutably. The successful sending of a transaction must be
checked.
• Retrieving Blockchain Data
The prototype has to be able to access data that is already stored in the blockchain.
• Minimize Time Between Transactions
As the production machine may have to update values frequently, building and sending a
transaction may not take longer than 10 seconds.
• Real World Interaction
The designed component must offer means to communicate with the real world and obtain
data that is to be stored.
3.1.3 Non-functional Requirements
• Minimize Security Risks
Gateway solutions are vulnerable to attacks like data manipulation on the way from machine
to gateway or while a transaction is built in the gateway, see Section 2.3.2. The developed
system architecture must have as little attack vectors from the outside as possible to minimize
security risks.
• Measure Degree of Trust
Along with the prototype concept development, it is also required to develop an approach to
measure the degree of trust that some data is durably stored in the blockchain.
3.2 Choice of Technology
Before developing a design, different decisions concerning the used technologies have to be made.
In this case, it comprises both hardware and software technologies.
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3.2.1 Hardware Technology
The key point of the design is that it differs from the usual gateway solutions. This means, it is not
making sense to run the design on a general purpose computer. The platform should have as little
underlying operation system functionalities as possible. This is useful for various reasons:
First, it reduces the possibility for attacks. For an attacker it is easier to manipulate a machine
the more interfaces it has to the outside. By having a hardware as primitive as possible but still
powerful enough to complete its task, the amount of attack vectors is minimized.
Secondly, the less overhead caused by a full operation system, the faster simple calculations and
operations can be made.
Besides, the component should be used to retrieve and process machine data. A lot of machines,
especially older ones, do not offer high-level interfaces for communicating with the world outside.
They often use a serial data bus interface to exchange data, and a general purpose computer might
not be able to interpret the data without the use of additional software.
That is why a microcontroller is the ideal platform to program the required prototype on. A
microcontroller unit (MCU) can be defined as “...a computer present in a single integrated circuit
which is dedicated to perform one task and execute one specific application” [Tec18].
One central feature that the MCU is required to have is a WiFi capability. This is essential for the
MCU to exchange data with a blockchain that is only accessible via the Internet. This requirement
massively narrows down the choice of an appropriate MCU.
Computational power and memory storage are negligible criteria, as the MCU will not be needed
for complex timing-critical calculations or as a storage of big amounts of data.
A further criterion is the price of the MCU. It should be kept low in order to be able to equip
multiple machines with the MCU in the future.
All these criteria led to the NodeMCU with an EPS8266 WiFi module as the technology of choice
[Nod18b]. NodeMCU is the name of a firmware as well as the corresponding MCU board. The
firmware is based on eLua and it runs on the ESP8266 WiFi module which has a Tensilica Xtensa
L106 processor [Nod18a] [Esp18].
Programming the MCU can be done via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface and with different
tools. Apart from Lua, there are several other programming languages supported by the ESP8266.
The programming language used in the scope of this work is Arduino C/C++ [Ard18][Gro18].
The NodeMCU Development Kit board is powered with 5V via micro USB either from a regular
USB port or with a power adapter. It has a total of 30 pins which can be plugged e.g. in a
development breadboard. Some of the pins have general purpose digital input/output functionality,
others are ground pins or constant 3.3V output. Certain pins do also support interfaces like universal
asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART) or Serial Peripheral Interface bus (SPI).
Figure 3.1 shows the layout of the board and the functions of the individual pins.
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Figure 3.1: Layout of NodeMCU pins [Sah17]
The board can be purchased on the Internet for less than 10 Euro a piece. The low price together with
the broad functionality and WiFi capability makes the NodeMCU the ideal choice for programming
the desired prototype.
3.2.2 Software Technology
In the following, some decisions about the used software components are discussed. They comprise
the targeted blockchain implementation as well as the prototype’s programming language and
development environment.
Blockchain Implementation
The four blockchain implementations that were presented in Section 2.2 are some of the best known
and most widely used ones. While Bitcoin and Ethereum are similar to each other, a comparison to
Hyperledger Fabric or IOTA is more sophisticated and will be done as a second step.
Table 3.1 gives a brief overview of the four presented blockchain implementations. Bitcoin and
Ethereum both offer an open source blockchain implementation with their respective tokens, BTC
and ETH. In both technologies, transactions can be issued sending tokens from one address to
42
3.2 Choice of Technology
Table 3.1: Overview of different blockchain implementations
Implementation Main Features
Bitcoin - Public, permissionless, decentralized
- Transactions with a block time of approximately 10 minutes
- Sending and receiving of tokens, little to no user defined data can
be stored
Ethereum - Public, permissionless, decentralized
- Smart contracts enabling dApps
- Arbitrary data can be added to transactions, though increasing fee
Hyperledger Fabric - Private, permissioned, decentralized
- Groups of users set up own blockchain instances
- No tokens, no mining, focus on exchange of data
IOTA - Public, permissionless, currently centralized (to be decentralized
in the future)
- DAG with single transactions, no classic blockchain
- Fast and cheap M2M transactions
another. For an industrial application, sending tokens plays a subordinate role. More important is
the ability to send arbitrary data, e.g. information about a fabrication process or a machine’s status.
But the data should not be just sent to the blockchain, but also processed there and potentially
trigger further events or actions. That is where smart contracts come into play. Bitcoin does not
offer any smart contracts or similar possibilities in contrast to Ethereum. The latter was specifically
designed to expand Bitcoin’s concept e.g. for the development of smart contracts [But14]. As smart
contract functionality is essential for an industrial application, Ethereum is superior to Bitcoin in
this aspect. In addition to smart contracts, Ethereum also has a shorter block time (10-15 seconds
in contrast to 10 minutes) which makes new transactions visible faster. That is why Ethereum is
superior to Bitcoin for the required use case.
As Bitcoin has been ruled out as a potential technology, Ethereum must now be compared to
Hyperledger Fabric. This comparison cannot be done as easily as the one before, becauseHyperledger
Fabric has a fundamentally different design and therefore different properties. Hyperledger Fabric
targets a group of users who want to work together on one Hyperledger Fabric instance, which
consists of private and permissioned blockchains. An instance has to be initially set up and rules
for endorsement and interaction have to be agreed upon. While this makes sense for a private,
B2B blockchain, it also poses a huge overhead of work that has to be invested before there is an up
and running instance. For a prototypical client implementation, a blockchain with one single peer
is rather pointless. As the main task of this work is designing a prototype, it makes more sense
to use an already existing blockchain instance. Additionally, a blockchain client for Hyperledger
Fabric would result in a very special solution tailored for the many specific properties that this
implementation has. When designing a prototype for e.g. Ethereum, the concepts can be transferred
to many similar blockchain implementations with little effort. Therefore, this also facilitates the
portability of the design. That is why Ethereum is favored over Hyperledger Fabric in this work.
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Last but not least, IOTA is to be compared with Ethereum. IOTA focuses on M2M transactions
which are fast and cheap. Yet it does not support any kind of native smart contracts. This means that
a transaction can be issued and also measured data from a production environment can be put into
the transaction, but the data would only get stored. IOTA is still undergoing a lot of development
and the amount of transactions in the network is rather low, with a few transactions per second
[The18c]. Another point of criticism is the de facto centralization via the coordinator which is still
present at the time of this work’s creation in June 2018. If one day the IOTA Foundation decided
to lock out certain accounts, there is little that could be done about it. Out of all these reasons,
Ethereum should be preferred over IOTA, at least until IOTA overcomes the majority of the above
stated problems.
Consequently, Ethereum is the technology of choice for this work’s blockchain prototype.
Integrated Development Environment
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the NodeMCU will be programmed with Arduino C/C++. Therefore,
the use of the Arduino integrated development environment (IDE) is recommended. The version
used for developing the prototype is 1.8.2. The IDE can be configured to program a variety of
different MCU boards with their respective properties. Downloading and managing libraries for the
supported boards can also be done directly in the IDE.
A design, here called sketch, is written and compiled in the IDE. If there are no errors, the IDE
uploads it to the connected MCU board via the computer’s COM port. With a serial interface, the
connected MCU generates output which is readable on the computer screen, e.g. for debugging
purposes. The monitor necessary for this is included in the Arduino IDE.
3.3 Transaction Detail
The core element of each blockchain are transactions which are executed and stored there. The
details of the Ethereum network as well as transactions within it are investigated in the following.
3.3.1 Client
The Ethereum network is formed by a multitude of P2P nodes all around the world. The specific
instance of a node is called client. There exist several implementations in different programming
languages. The two most used implementations are “go-ethereum” written in Go and “Parity”
written in Rust. Apart from these, there are also implementations in C++, Python, Java and a
few other programming languages [Eth18a]. The clients communicate with each other, build
transactions and retrieve information about the blockchain’s status. Therefore, the clients are
constantly connected to the Internet in order to regularly update the ledger. Additionally, a client
requires a huge amount of hard drive space, as it has to download and maintain the whole blockchain.
The exact amount of necessary space also depends on the chosen client implementation. The
following formula describes the daily growth of the Ethereum blockchain size.
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Let λ be the daily growth rate of the blockchain in megabytes, s the size of a block in kilobytes and
f the time between the generation of two blocks in seconds. The daily growth rate then is:
λ =
s · 60 · 60 · 24
1000 · f
When assuming a block size of 15kb, which is slightly below the average block size in the time
window from May 2017 to May 2018 [Eth18c] and an average time between two blocks of 12
seconds, the equation results in the following:
λ =
15kb · 60 · 60 · 24
1000 · 12s = 108mb/d
This means that the size of the Ethereum blockchain is currently growing with approximately 100
mb a day, or 3 gb per month.
The problem of growing size led to the development of so called “light clients” which download
only the headers of all the blocks. If necessary, additional information gets downloaded on demand,
which drastically reduces the required hard drive space [Git17b].
For the most prominent client implementation, go-ethereum, there exists a command line interface
called “geth”. When running an Ethereum node, geth allows the execution of remote procedure
calls (RPCs) to interact with the blockchain.
3.3.2 Communication Interface
This section explains the mechanics of RPCs and the data interchange format JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON). They are both components of the main interface for interaction with the Ethereum
blockchain, which is JSON-RPC.
Remote Procedure Calls
The term RPC comes from the distributed computing domain and describes a concept for calling
functions on a remote machine [BN84]. The goal of an RPC is the execution of a function on a
remote machine as easy as if it was executed on the local machine. The concept is often used in a
client-server environment. The server offers functions for clients to call. When a client calls one of
these functions, it sends the necessary parameters. The server then processes the request with the
given parameters and generates an appropriate response which is sent back to the client. This form
of communication is therefore called a request-response protocol.
In a classic RPC, the client is blocked while waiting for the server’s response. That is why RPC is
considered a synchronous protocol. In contrast to this design, asynchronous protocols prevent the
client from actively waiting for a response. It can execute other functions or process data while
passively waiting.
A client also has to handle the situation that the server is not sending any response at all. This can
happen due to network failures or the server currently being offline.
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Listing 3.1 Exemplary JSON object for the user of a web shop
{
"customer": {
"username": "Randomuser",
"email": "Randomuser@mailprovider.com",
"shippinginformation": {
"country": "Somecountry",
"city": "Famouscity",
"zipcode": "12345",
"street": "Firststreet",
"housenumber": 7
},
"recentorders" : [
"thisitem",
"thatitem",
"anotheritem"
],
"useractive": true
}
}
JavaScript Object Notation
JSON is a text-based data interchange format [Bra14] [JSO18]. It is language-independent and
easily readable for humans. In addition to that, it is also easy for machines to parse or generate
the JSON format. It is often used when structured data has to be serialized. JSON offers two
different structures: collections of name-value pairs (called objects) and ordered lists (called arrays).
Some forms of these two data structures exist in any modern programming language, making JSON
widely usable.
Apart from objects and arrays, JSON has four primitive data types. They are strings consisting of
arbitrary unicode characters, boolean values true or false, numbers and the null value.
An object is surrounded by curly brackets ({...}) and contains an unordered set of name-value pairs,
separated with commas. An array starts and ends with square brackets ([...]) and contains ordered
values, also separated with commas.
JSON structures can also be arbitrarily nested, enabling the representation of more complex
objects.
Listing 3.1 shows an exemplary JSON object representing the user data of a web shop customer.
Note that “useractive” is a boolean value and “housenumber” is a number, hence they both do not
require quotation marks. Several objects are nested in this example and “recentorders” consists of
an ordered list with three elements.
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JSON-RPC
The two previously described concepts are combined together in a protocol called JSON-RPC
[JSO13]. The version currently used in Ethereum is 2.0. JSON-RPC is a stateless RPC protocol
built on JSON data structures and it can be used in various message passing environments, e.g.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or sockets.
Alike other RPC implementations, it is request-response-based. A request object has these
members:
• jsonrpc
A string specifying which JSON-RPC protocol version is used. In Ethereum, this string
should always be “2.0”.
• method
This string is the name of the remote method that is to be called.
• params
If present, this is a JSON structure containing the parameters for the function call. It can
either be an object containing name-value pairs for each parameter of the called function, or
an array where the parameters have to be in a fixed and correct order. If no parameters are
needed for the called function, this member may also be omitted.
• id
This identifier can be a string, a number or null. It is used by the client to signalize that it
expects a response from the server. The server’s response then contains the identifier of the
client’s request. If this field is omitted, the client indicates that it does not want to receive a
response. Such a request without corresponding response is called a notification.
Upon receiving a request, the server processes it with the delivered parameters. After the request is
processed, the server sends a response object of the following form back to its client:
• jsonrpc
A string specifying which JSON-RPC protocol version is used. In Ethereum, this string
should always be “2.0”.
• result
This member only exists if the function call was successful. The absence of the member
indicates that an error occurred in the remote procedure. The value of this member depends
on the function that was called on the server. It contains the result of the function call that the
client made.
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• error
If this member is present, an error occurred during the RPC. It then contains an error object
giving further information about the error as well as an error code. This member may not be
sent if the function was executed successfully.
• id
This member is required in a server’s response. It must be the same id as in the client’s
corresponding request.
Ethereum nodes, i.e. clients, offer an application programming interface (API) based on this
JSON-RPC protocol [Git18d]. A multitude of methods allow the interaction with the Ethereum
blockchain. The RPC endpoint is localhost. An application that runs on the same machine as the
blockchain client can call these methods. Note that the blockchain client hereby becomes the RPC
server, with the application being the RPC client.
3.3.3 Building a Transaction
Transactions in Ethereum can be sent between any two accounts. The accounts can either be
externally owned accounts (EOAs), i.e. an account controlled by a private key, or contract accounts
[Eth18b]. A transaction always has to contain the following information: the address of the receiver
(EOA or smart contract), a signature identifying the sender and proving the intention to send the
transaction, an ETH amount to be sent, a data field for arbitrary data, a maximum limit of gas to
be used by the transaction and a price per unit of gas. In addition to these values, a nonce is used
to count the outgoing transactions of an address. With each transaction that the sending address
issues, the nonce gets increased by one. That way, an order can be obtained when many transactions
are issued within a short time frame. If the nonce of a transaction is higher than the account’s
expected nonce, the transaction does not get processed immediately by the Ethereum network. The
transaction is pending until enough other transactions from the same account have been made.
Finally, when the expected nonce equals the nonce of the pending transaction, it gets executed.
A schematic for the effect of nonces is given in Figure 3.2. If the two transactions with the same
nonce are issued shortly after each other and the second transaction pays a higher gas price, then
the first transaction is canceled. This only works if the earlier transaction was not yet added into a
block. The transaction with nonce 3 does not get put into a block before a further transaction with
the nonce 2 is issued.
Optionally, a further field can be added to transactions, the chain ID. This is an identifier for the
different Ethereum blockchains, i.e. the main blockchain and several test blockchains.
Before a transaction’s signature is calculated, the transaction is called unsigned. As a JSON object,
an unsigned transaction looks as shown in Listing 3.2. All the values except for the chain ID are
given in strings starting with the prefix “0x” and are interpreted as hexadecimal values. v, r and s
together form the signature. Because this is an unsigned transaction, the values for the signature
elements are not yet filled in.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of nonces in the Ethereum blockchain
The necessary mechanisms to get from an unsigned to a signed Ethereum transaction are investigated
in the following.
Recursive Length Prefix
The purpose of the recursive length prefix (RLP) is the serialization of arbitrarily nested arrays
containing data in the Ethereum network [Git18g]. The output is a special encoding consisting of
one single array containing all the information of the nested arrays. The now serialized data can be
sent as a single string and afterwards the receiver can decode it. RLP does not encode the data
contained in the arrays itself, but only the structure of the nested arrays.
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Listing 3.2 Unsigned Ethereum transaction as a JSON structure
{
"nonce" : "0x00",
"gasPrice" : "0x1234567890",
"gasLimit" : "0x5500",
"to" : "0x1234567891234567891234567891234567890000",
"value" : "0x1234",
"data" : "0xabcd",
"chainId" : 1,
"v" : "",
"r" : "",
"s" : ""
}
In Ethereum, the data that is to be serialized consists of strings or integer values. Characters of a
string get their ASCII value as a hexadecimal number assigned and therefore have a size of 1 byte.
Hexadecimal values (as seen e.g. in Listing 3.2) take one byte per two hexadecimal digits.
The rules for the RLP encoding then are the following [Tu18]:
• If the input to the RLP encoding is just a single byte in the range [ 0x00, 0x7f ], then the
output is the byte itself.
• The output of an empty string or an empty byte is 0x80. This may not be confused with the
byte 0x00, because the encoding of this byte would be itself.
• If the input is a single byte in the range [ 0x80, 0xff ], it is a special character as it is out of
the alphanumeric ASCII table range. Such a byte is encoded with a 0x81 followed by the
byte itself.
• If the input is not just a single byte, but a string with a length of 2 to 55 bytes, the encoding
consists of two parts. The first part is the byte 0x80 plus the length of the input string in bytes.
The second part is the bytes of the string.
• Should the input string be longer than 55 bytes, then the encoding consists of three parts. The
first part is a byte with value 0xb7 plus the length of the second part in bytes. The second
part is a hex value for the length of the input string represented in bytes. The third and last
part is again the bytes of the input string as hex values.
• Not just strings, but also arrays can be encoded. The encoding of an empty array returns 0xc0
as an output.
• If the input is a list with a total of at most 55 bytes, the RLP encoding is a byte with value
0xc0 plus the length of the list followed by the encoded values for each list item.
• Should the input be a list which is more than 55 bytes long, the encoding once again consists
of 3 parts. The first part is a byte with the value 0xf7 plus the length of the second part. The
second part is a hex value for the length of the input in bytes. The third and last part is a
concatenation of the RLP encodings for each item in the list.
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This set of rules allows for the encoding of strings and arbitrarily nested lists. The RLP decoding is
done by the receiver and is therefore not needed when building a transaction. Thus, it is not further
explained here.
An RLP encoding of the string “Ethereum” would result in the output [ 0x88, 0x45, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x72, 0x65, 0x75, 0x6D ]
Keccak-256
Keccak-256 is a hashing algorithm used in several steps throughout the whole Ethereum network
[BDPA11]. It is similar to the well known hashing standard SHA-3, but the two algorithms indeed
produce different outputs and may not be confused with each other.
The hashing algorithm takes an arbitrarily long input string and generates an output of exactly
32 bytes. Hashing the same input string again results in the same output. As with every hashing
function, the initial input cannot easily be calculated from a known output.
One important application area for Keccak-256 in Ethereum is the generation of account addresses.
An EOA’s address is not the public key of the asymmetrical key pair itself, but it is derived from
it. More precisely, the public key gets hashed with Keccak-256 and the rightmost 20 bytes of the
output yield the EOA’s address [Woo18]. The addresses are normally represented as hexadecimal
values, and so every Ethereum address has a length of 40 hexadecimal digits.
Another crucial step were Keccak-256 is used happens right before a transaction is signed. The
signature creation algorithm does not take the whole transaction data and generates a signature for
it. Instead, it signs only the hash of a transaction. The hash is generated on the RLP of the unsigned
transaction.
Keccak-256 is also used to derive an identifier for issued transactions, i.e. a transaction ID. As an
input to the hash function, the unsigned transaction data as well as a valid signature are given. The
output of the function is a 32 byte long string which unambiguously identifies a transaction. This
identifier is also stored in the blockchain along with the transaction detail.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSA is a cryptography method which became a standard in the late 1990s [JMV01]. The classic
DSA relies on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. The problem statement is
the following [BG04]:
Given a, y, find x ∈ Z solving the equation y = ax mod G
If an adequate group is chosen, there is no method known yet to solve the discrete logarithm problem
efficiently. This property makes it an interesting candidate for the use in cryptography. ECDSA
differs from the classic DSA by the choice of its underlying group. In ECDSA, the group consists
of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field. As the discrete logarithm problem of elliptic
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curves is believed to be harder solvable than the classic discrete logarithm problem, ECDSA offers
several advantages in comparison to DSA. The strength-per-key-bit in ECDSA is greater than in
DSA, resulting in smaller parameters offering the same level of security. This also enables a faster
calculation of keys or signatures and reduces the storage space for them.
Though the basic steps of the algorithm are clearly described, there exist different variants of it.
This is due to the use of different elliptic curves. An elliptic curve Ek defined over a field K of
characteristics , 2 or 3 is the set of solutions (x,y) ∈ K2 to the equation [Kob87]:
y2 = x3 + ax + b, with a, b ∈ K
Ethereum uses the secp-256k1 curve for both key pair generation and transaction signatures [Woo18].
The algorithm creates key pairs with a length of 32 bytes for the private key and 64 bytes for the
public key. A once generated key pair can be used for an arbitrary amount of transactions.
The act of signing a transaction though is needed more frequently than the generation of new key
pairs. We recall that each Ethereum transaction has three parameters for its signature, v, r and s.
The input to the ECDSA sign function is the hash of the unsigned message’s RLP encoding and the
private key (both 32 bytes long). The generated signature has a length of 2 x 32 bytes, which then
get assigned to r and s. The ECDSA algorithm includes randomness, which leads to the following
behavior: even if the same data gets signed with the exact same private key, the resulting signature
is different each time.
ECDSA has the property that the public key of a signature can be obtained by knowing the signature
itself as well as the data that was signed. Because both of these parameters are known once a
transaction is signed and issued, the receiving nodes can calculate the sender’s public key, hash
it and thereby receive the sending address. This procedure of re-calculating the address from the
signature has two advantages: first, the transaction data gets smaller, because the sending address
does not have to be explicitly added to the transaction. Apart from that, the signature verifies that
the sender is indeed the owner of an account’s private key.
Unfortunately, the so calculated public key is ambiguous, as there are always two possible values
solving the equation. This means that out of the two possible solutions, only one public key is the
correct one. That is what the v component of the signature is used for. It is called the “recovery
parameter”, as it is used to recover the correct public key of a transaction. Necessary for the correct
recovery is the information whether the calculated point on the elliptic curve has an odd or even y
coordinate. This information can be stored in 1 bit. However, the v component also stores the chain
ID, i.e. an identifier distinguishing the different Ethereum blockchain instances. Thus, the value for
v is calculated with the following formula [Git18b]:
v = Chain ID · 2 + 35 + Parity Bit
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After a transaction was successfully signed, it is not possible to change any of its data without
the signature becoming invalid. A receiving node checks the validity of the signature against the
transaction data. If any data is changed on the way from signature generation to a receiving node,
the signature check will fail. So if a node receives a transaction that can be considered invalid, it
gets rejected with an error code.
Steps of Building a Transaction
Now that all necessary prerequisites and functions used for building valid Ethereum transactions
are presented, we will take a closer look at the single steps. They are shown in Figure 3.3.
Step 1: Building an Unsigned Transaction As a first step, the different parameters of an unsigned
transaction have to be determined. If this is done, the result is a transaction as shown in Listing 3.3.
It does not have to be organized as a JSON structure, but for easier readability a transaction will be
represented as such in the scope of this work.
Listing 3.3 Step 1: Creating an unsigned Ethereum transaction
{
"nonce" : "0x0c",
"gasPrice" : "0x3b9aca00",
"gasLimit" : "0xc350",
"to" : "0x9876543210987654321098765432109876543210",
"value" : "0x1388",
"data" : "0xc0de",
"v" : "0x03",
"r" : "",
"s" : ""
}
The nonce indicates that it was the 12th transaction outgoing from this account. The gas price is
exactly one billion wei (1 gwei). The gas limit is 50000 wei, meaning the transaction fee will be not
higher than 0.00005 ETH. The amount of sent ETH to the receiver address is 5000 wei. Note that
the Chain ID has the value 3 (for the Ropsten test net) and is used as a value for the parameter v of
the unsigned transaction. r and s do not have a value yet.
Now that all relevant data for a transaction is collected, one can proceed with the next step.
Step 2: Creating an RLP Encoding of the Unsigned Transaction The transaction data is
interpreted as strings (omitting the “0x” prefix) and the RLP encoding is performed. Because the
names of the different parameters are not part of the RLP, the data has to be arranged in a specific
order. The order is the same as in the JSON object shown in Listing 3.3, though a JSON object is a
set of values rather than an ordered list. The plain data organized in a list is shown in Listing 3.4.
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0xe70c843b9aca008...
r = c31899…
s = 67379a…
v = 1
Step 1:
Unsigned Transaction
RLP Encoding
Step 2:
RLP Encoded
Unsigned Transaction
Hashing
0xfa6ff216dec4fb44...
Step 3:
Unsigned Transaction Hash
Step 4:
Signing the Hash
0xf8670c843b9aca0...
Step 5:
RLP Encoded
Signed Transaction
Signing
RLP Encoding
Figure 3.3: Different steps for generating a signed Ethereum transaction
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Listing 3.4 Step 2.1: Organizing the transaction data in an ordered list
["0c", "3b9aca00", "c350", "9876543210987654321098765432109876543210", "1388",
"c0de", "03", "", "" ]
This list now gets RLP encoded, resulting in the string shown in Listing 3.5:
Listing 3.5 Step 2.2: RLP encoding of an unsigned transaction
RLP(["0c", "3b9aca00", "c350", "9876543210987654321098765432109876543210", "1388",
"c0de", "03", "", "" ])
=
"0xe70c843b9aca0082c35094987654321098765432109876543210987654321082138882c0de038080"
Now the whole transaction structure is serialized without the loss of any information.
Step 3: Hashing the RLP Encoded Unsigned Transaction The string shown in Listing 3.5
now has to be hashed with the Keccak-256 hash function. The input to this hash function can be
arbitrarily long, the output is always 32 bytes long, representable as a 64 digit hexadecimal string.
The hash function output for the previous RLP encoding is shown in Listing 3.6.
Listing 3.6 Step 3: Keccak-256 hash of the RLP encoded unsigned transaction
Keccak-256(
"e70c843b9aca0082c35094987654321098765432109876543210987654321082138882c0de038080")
= "fa6ff216dec4fb44bc1a6381600a910bea00f3f52a68e4e0ced0b8123be2679c"
We have now obtained the hash for this specific unsigned transaction. When performing the hashing
algorithm multiple times on the same data, the result will always be the same (in contrast to the
ECDSA algorithm).
Step 4: Signing the Obtained Hash with ECDSA At this point, all the information for creating a
signed transaction is available. The 32 byte long Keccak-256 hash is given to the ECDSA function
along with the private key which also consists of 32 bytes. The result of the signature calculation
are values for the parameters v, r and s of the unsigned transaction. This is shown in Listing 3.7.
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Listing 3.7 Step 4: Signing the Keccak-256 hash with ECDSA
ECDSA_sign("fa6ff216dec4fb44bc1a6381600a910bea00f3f52a68e4e0ced0b8123be2679c",
PRIVATE_KEY)
=
{
"r" : "c3189977506593aacc96149481d6cdd33737649bc4aa73171054f36253d58298",
"s" : "67379abbd178970890fe17b36ac71a53873fe6dfb278fe4e5f4f518761e8f7aa",
"v" : "1"
}
The signature as well as the recovery bit are now successfully calculated from the unsigned
transaction. It can now be considered signed. Before it is issued, all the data has to be serialized
once again.
Step 5: RLP Encoding the Signed Transaction One last step before serializing the signed
transaction is calculating the correct v parameter. According to the previously presented formula,
the v value for recovery bit = 1 and Chain ID = 3 (Ropsten test net) is 42, or as a hexadecimal
number 0x2a. A JSON structure for the signed transaction ready to be RLP encoded one last time
can be seen in Listing 3.8:
Listing 3.8 Step 5.1: Signed transaction ready to be RLP encoded
{
"nonce" : "0x0c",
"gasPrice" : "0x3b9aca00",
"gasLimit" : "0xc350",
"to" : "0x9876543210987654321098765432109876543210",
"value" : "0x1388",
"data" : "0xc0de",
"v" : "0x2a",
"r" : "0xc3189977506593aacc96149481d6cdd33737649bc4aa73171054f36253d58298",
"s" : "0x67379abbd178970890fe17b36ac71a53873fe6dfb278fe4e5f4f518761e8f7aa"
}
After the final RLP encoding was performed on the signed transaction data, the serialized string can
be seen in Listing 3.9.
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Listing 3.9 Step 5.2: RLP encoded signed transaction
RLP(["0c", "3b9aca00", "c350", "9876543210987654321098765432109876543210", "1388",
"c0de", "2a",
"c3189977506593aacc96149481d6cdd33737649bc4aa73171054f36253d58298",
"67379abbd178970890fe17b36ac71a53873fe6dfb278fe4e5f4f518761e8f7aa"])
= "0xf8670c843b9aca0082c35094987654321098765432109876543210987654321082138882c0de2a
a0c3189977506593aacc96149481d6cdd33737649bc4aa73171054f36253d58298a067379abbd178
970890fe17b36ac71a53873fe6dfb278fe4e5f4f518761e8f7aa"
This string can now be issued as a valid and signed Ethereum transaction. Therefore it has to be
sent to an Ethereum node’s JSON-RPC. Once a node picks up the transaction and acknowledges its
validity, it is broadcasted to other nodes. At this point in time, the transaction gets assigned an ID.
Eventually, a mining node picks up the transaction and puts it into a block.
Optional Step 6: Calculating the transaction ID Once a transaction is received by the first node,
an ID for this transaction is calculated and usually also sent back inside the JSON response object.
In order to check the correctness of the received ID or if out of some reason no ID is received at all,
the transaction issuer can calculate the ID itself. Therefore, the RLP encoded string of the signed
transaction has to be hashed once again with the Keccak-256 function. The result for the exemplary
transaction is given in Listing 3.10.
Listing 3.10 Optional Step 6: Calculate the transaction ID
Keccak-256(
"f8670c843b9aca0082c35094987654321098765432109876543210987654321082138882c0de2a
a0c3189977506593aacc96149481d6cdd33737649bc4aa73171054f36253d58298a067379abbd17
8970890fe17b36ac71a53873fe6dfb278fe4e5f4f518761e8f7aa")
= "09d30c7553af79cab6fddd0b107aa16d41ffefd3f9ae9907b32d9cc466dac67f"
The transaction creation is now completed and can be checked e.g. with a blockchain explorer. The
necessary reference for the transaction is only its ID1.
1The exemplary transaction shown here was indeed built and sent to the Ropsten test net Ethereum blockchain. It
can be checked e.g. with the block explorer etherscan.io under the link https://ropsten.etherscan.io/tx/
0x09d30c7553af79cab6fddd0b107aa16d41ffefd3f9ae9907b32d9cc466dac67f
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3.4 Different System Architecture Approaches
Now that it is clear which steps are required to build a valid transaction, the best fitting system
architecture approach has to be found. The MCU does not have the required storage (see Section
3.3.1) and bandwidth capacity to act as a full Ethereum node. In fact, this is also not needed
for the use case of issuing transactions. Ethereum nodes offer a lot functionality, they have to
communicate with each other, maintain a blockchain copy and perform further tasks. This causes a
huge computational power overhead and demands for a more complex hardware. That is why a full
Ethereum node has to run somewhere, and the MCU has to be able to call the node’s JSON-RPC
methods. For distributing the transaction building process between the MCU and the Ethereum
node, two different approaches with different levels of security will be presented.
3.4.1 Sign on Ethereum Client
The first approach requires an Ethereum node with a JSON-RPC running in the same network that
the MCU’s WiFi connection is set up to. The Ethereum client holds the private key in this scenario
and RPC calls requiring the use of the private key need to first unlock it with a password. The MCU
could then issue RPC calls for various functions of blockchain interaction. Building a valid and
signed transaction would then work like this:
The MCU collects and processes the data that it wants to store on the blockchain. This means
that the MCU builds an unsigned transaction analog to the first step in the previous section. If
this is done, the MCU makes an HTTP request to the Ethereum client’s JSON-RPC interface.
The adequate RPC method for such unsigned message transaction is “eth_sendTransaction”. The
parameters necessary for this RPC call have to be sent in a JSON object. They comprise [Git18d]:
• “from” - The 20 bytes long address of the sender.
• “to” - The 20 bytes long address of the receiver, or, if left empty, the transaction is interpreted
as a contract creation.
• “gas” - This is the maximum amount of gas that the transaction may cost. This parameter can
be left empty, resulting in a default gas value of 90000.
• “gasPrice” - Price for each unit of used gas in wei.
• “value” - The amount of ETH sent to the receiving address. If left empty, no ETH is sent (e.g.
for calling smart contract functions).
• “data” - Arbitrary data of the transaction that also gets stored in the blockchain. Can
alternatively be used to call smart contract functions.
• “nonce” - This gives an order to transactions. If a nonce is used in two transactions and the
first one was not yet put in a block, the older transaction can be overwritten.
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After the “eth_sendTransaction” RPC call with appropriate parameters, the Ethereum client executes
the remaining steps of the transaction building protocol. It finally signs the transaction and
broadcasts it to its peer nodes. After a short while (also depending on the gas price), the transaction
gets executed and becomes a part of the blockchain history. A schematic for this system architecture
is shown in Figure 3.4.
Though this system architecture is fairly easy to understand and implement, it has some major
downsides, especially in terms of security. The MCU is used here mainly to collect and process data
coming from a production machine. After this is done, the data is sent via HTTP to the Ethereum
client running on a general purpose computer or a very powerful single-board computer (e.g. a
Raspberry Pi). The computer receives the data, performs the cryptographic operations and then
issues the transaction to the network. With this setup, the same problems already described in
Section 2.3.2 arise. The measured data could potentially be manipulated on its way from the MCU
to the Ethereum node. Additionally, the computer that runs the Ethereum client could be attacked
or already be infected with malware. Therefore, a secure transmission from a production machine
into the blockchain cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the MCU would have to somehow unlock the
Ethereum private key on the computer. If the password for this is sent via HTTP, it might also get
exposed.
A setup like this would work, but it can definitely not be considered secure.
3.4.2 Sign on Microcontroller
A more sophisticated but also more promising approach is this one: the whole data processing and
signature generation is performed on the MCU. In order to send the transaction, there is still the
need for an Ethereum client. But in contrast to the first approach, this client does not have to run in
the same network. How exactly this works is explained in the following:
After obtaining the desired data from a productionmachine, theMCU creates an unsigned transaction,
the same way as in the previous approach. Instead of calling the RPC of an Ethereum client in
the same network, the MCU performs the signature generation itself. It creates one serialized
transaction containing a valid signature. Therefore, the private key only needs to be stored on the
MCU. The signed transaction string can then once again be sent via HTTP. The Ethereum client
receiving the transaction does now not have to run in the same network. In fact, any node offering
the JSON-RPC interface to the public can be used. A schematic for this approach can be seen in
Figure 3.5.
Once the transaction left the MCU, it is not possible to alter any data without the signature becoming
invalid, which would result in the rejection of the transaction by the Ethereum network. This
approach prevents production data getting manipulated on the way from a production machine into
the blockchain. It could still happen that the transaction gets lost on its way from the MCU to the
client, or that the client is corrupt. The data would then not be stored, but still there would never be
manipulated data stored.
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60
3.4 Different System Architecture Approaches
Blockchain
Production
Machine
Computer running
Ethereum Client
Send Data
Process Data, Build 
Signed Transaction
Send Signed 
Transaction via HTTP 
to JSON-RPC
a1
1
a2
2
3
a3
4
a4
b1
b2
b3
b4
5
6
7
8
Micro-
controller
Broadcast Signed 
Transaction
Other Ethereum Nodes
Transaction is 
put into Block
Figure 3.5: System architecture with microcontroller signing a transaction
61
3 Conception
Of course, another JSON-RPC call has to be made for the described approach. Apart from
the “eth_sendTransaction” function, there is a second one for sending transactions. It is called
“eth_sendRawTransaction” and takes only one parameter, which is the signed transaction RLP
encoding. As a result, the RPC call returns the 32 byte long Keccak-256 hash of the transaction string
inside a JSON response object. This ID can also be calculated by the MCU itself, if necessary.
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This section shows how the prototypical implementation of the concept described in Section 3.4.2
can be realized. It demonstrates that the previously presented concept indeed works and that it can
be adapted for different upcoming use cases.
4.1 General Microcontroller Program Information
Each Arduino C/C++ program running on the NodeMCU has to have at least two basic functions.
The first one is the function “void setup()”. This function is called whenever the MCU is supplied
with power. When the setup routine is finished, a second function is called automatically, which
is the “void loop()” function. As the name already gives away, this is the MCU’s main program
execution loop. As long as the power supply is provided, this loop runs and executes code. Once it
has reached its end, the loop function is started again automatically.
The prototype’s code consists exclusively of .ino files (which is the Arduino C/C++ format), and
regular C/C++ files (.c/.cpp) along with their respective header files (.h). After successful code
compilation, a binary file is created and uploaded on the device. This binary file contains all used
libraries, as the MCU later runs autonomously without a connection to a programming device.
When the MCU is operating while connected to a computer via a USB interface, a serial monitor
can be used. Outputting data to the serial monitor resembles the “printf” function of C. With the
serial output, human-readable data can be generated on the connected computer. This can be used
to output measured or calculated values and facilitate debugging.
With the “delay()” function, the code execution can be halted for a specified period of time.
4.2 Concrete Implementation
The implementation of the prototype consists of several components, each of which complete
different tasks. This encapsulation with well-defined interfaces in the form of functions makes it
easy to change or update specific parts of the code. The different components along with their
functionalities are explained in the following. An illustration of the single components and their
interactions in form of a Unified Modeling Language (UML) class diagram can be seen in Figure
4.1. The attributes of the components as well as parameters and return values are omitted in the
graphic to ensure a better readability. As the cryptographic component is a library included and
used in the main component, it is also not part of the diagram.
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Figure 4.1: UML diagram of the different implementation components
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Hashing Component
This portable C++ library implements the Keccak-256 hashing algorithm compliant with the
Ethereum protocol 2.
It is used to obtain the Keccak-256 hash of the unsigned transaction, which is then signed afterwards.
The library allows both hashing of strings and hashing of memory blocks in the form of bytes. In
order to generate the same hash as an Ethereum node, the data must be input formatted as bytes
(i.e. each two hexadecimal values have to be interpreted as one byte). Only then a valid hash is
generated.
Cryptographic Component
In order to perform the necessary cryptographic operations for building a valid Ethereum transaction,
the C library “uECC” is used 3. It implements various cryptographic functions like asymmetrical
key generation or signature verification with different elliptic curves.
The most important function for the prototype is the signature generation with the secp-256k1 curve.
The function gets as an input the byte formatted private key of the sending Ethereum account and
the byte formatted Keccak-256 hash of an unsigned transaction. As an output, the function returns
the 64 byte long signature. This signature can then be split into Ethereum’s r and s value, after they
are converted back to hexadecimal numbers again.
One important Ethereum protocol change from March 2016 has to be taken into account when
generating a signature. The solution space for valid s values of the signature was halved back then
[Git16]. From this point in time on, an Ethereum transaction has to have an s value equal to or
smaller than secp256k1nmax2 , with secp256k1nmax being the maximum possible value for s. This
means that on average, every second generated signature will be considered invalid by the Ethereum
network. When verifying the generated signatures with the uECC library, the result is of course
always correct. To overcome this issue, the size of a resulting s signature component is checked
directly after it was calculated. If the most significant byte is bigger than 128, i.e. s > secp256k1nmax2 ,
the signature creation function is called again. The probability to create a signature that will not be
accepted by the Ethereum network with this procedure is the following:
Pn(X = no success) =
(
1
2
)n
In this formula, n is the amount of times that the signature is generated. When generating the
signature ten times, the probability that still not a single one was valid until then, is:
P10(X = no success) =
(
1
2
)10
=
1
1024
< 0.1%
2The C++ library for the Keccak-256 hashing function can be obtained under http://create.stephan-brumme.com/
hash-library/
3The C library for ECDSA functions can be found under https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc
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As the signature generation can be done quickly, it can be repeated multiple times, see Section
6.1.2.
An adaption that had to be made to the original library concerned the recovery parameter. Usually,
an ECDSA algorithm only calculates the 64 bytes of the signature. Yet, Ethereum needs an
additional bit in order to correctly calculate the sender’s public key. The algorithm was modified so
it also returns the required bit in an extra parameter. This way, the sending address can always be
calculated correctly by the Ethereum network, without ever being transmitted.
Client Component
This component is used to get the signed transaction into the Ethereum blockchain. It offers a
function to connect the MCU to a WiFi. Furthermore, it establishes an Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS) to connection to the domain “api-ropsten.etherscan.io”. Etherscan is an Ethereum
block explorer which also offers tools for developers [Eth18d]. One of these tools is a geth/Parity
proxy API. It enables a user to send HTTP(S) requests which then get transformed into JSON-RPC
calls. The HTTP(S) requests can either be Get or Post requests and the parameters needed for the
JSON-RPC call have to be provided as HTTP parameters. For the prototypical implementation, no
Ethereum client running in the same network as the MCU and enabling a JSON-RPC is required.
Instead, the signed messages are brought into the blockchain by the publicly available Etherscan API.
That way, the MCU can always build and send transactions, as long as it is has a WiFi connection.
A further HTTPS call that was implemented retrieves the nonce of the Ethereum account whenever
the MCU program is started. The nonce is useful for ordering transactions, e.g. when multiple
transactions are issued before the first one is actually put into block. The MCU counts all its
successfully sent transactions since the power on and adds them to the initial value that was retrieved
via Etherscan’s API. That way, a time consistency throughout all issued transactions is ensured.
RLP Component
The RLP component implements the rules for an Ethereum conform transaction object serialization.
Its main function is “RlpEncodeTransaction”, which gets a transaction object as an input and
performs the RLP encoding steps. The component also offers helper functions for various data type
conversions, e.g. generating one byte from two hexadecimal values or transforming hexadecimal
numbers into integers.
Transaction Component
This component is a header file for a transaction. It is only used to capture a transaction’s structure
and the different parameters that a transaction has. The class itself does not offer any functions, as
this is not needed. Instead, other components directly set certain values of the transaction object.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of the hardware setup
Data Collection Component
The goal of this prototype is the immutable storage of measured data in the blockchain. This com-
ponent is responsible for obtaining data which has to be stored. In the prototypical implementation,
this data is a brightness value of the MCU’s surrounding. In order to measure a brightness value,
external hardware components have to be connected to the MCU. The hardware setup is shown in
Figure 4.2. The graphic was created with the tool Fritzing 4.
The part on the left side of the board is a photosensitive resistor. This means that the resistance
value changes depending on how much light hits the resistor’s surface. When strong light directly
shines on it, the resistance is a few Ω. In complete darkness, the value goes up to several MΩ. The
photosensitive resistor together with another resistor having a fixed value are used to build a voltage
divider at the board’s analog input pin. The analog input pin can measure a voltage in the range of 0
to 3.3V with a resolution of 10 bit, i.e. values from 0 to 1023.
We can now connect one of the constant 3.3V output pins over the photosensitive resistor to the
analog input pin, and at the same time connect the analog input pin over a further resistor to the
board’s ground pin. With this setup, much light leads to a small resistor value and therefore little
voltage drops at the photoresistor itself. Most of the voltage drops at the fixed value resistor. As the
analog pin measures the voltage against ground, it consequently receives a high value when the
brightness is high. The opposite happens for little light: the photoresistor has a high value, hence
little voltage drops over the second resistor, leading to a low voltage at the analog input pin.
4The tool Fritzing can be obtained under http://fritzing.org/home/
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The actual voltage that is measured at the analog input pin when using 10kΩ for the fixed resistor
can be calculated with the following formula:
Uanalog =
Uout · Rf ixed
Rphoto + Rf ixed
=
3.3V · 10000Ω
Rphoto + 10000Ω
This measured data could e.g. result from a production machine or its environment. The data
collection component can easily be modified or interchanged, measuring different data or directly
communicating with a production machine.
The component offers two functions to retrieve the current brightness value, either as an integer
value or as a hexadecimal representation prefixed with “0x”, which can then be further used for a
transaction’s data.
Main Component
This file is the core element of the MCU program. It contains the required setup() and loop()
function and coordinates all the other components. During the setup phase, it starts the serial output
communication in order to send debugging information to a connected computer, if available.
It also provides the uECC library with a function for generating random numbers, which is utilized
during signature generation. Values from multiple measurements of the analog input pin are taken to
generate an appropriate random number. That way, the random values cannot be predetermined, as
the analog input basically just measures noise. If necessary, the main component can also generate
and output new key pairs with the uECC library.
In the last setup step, the WiFi connection is established over the client component and an initial
HTTP request for obtaining the account’s current transaction nonce is performed.
Now that all prerequisites for the transaction generation and its transport are given, the loop function
can start. It has a fixed delay time for each loop iteration which can be configured before flashing
the MCU. The idea is the following: in each loop cycle, the MCU obtains a measurement value
from the data collection component. This value is to be stored on the blockchain. A signed and
valid transaction containing the measured value is built and sent to the Etherscan API via an HTTPS
request. If the request was successful, i.e. the API returns a transaction ID and has broadcasted the
transaction, the nonce for the next transaction is increased. Now that one loop cycle has finished, the
MCU code execution is halted for a specified period of time before generating the next transaction.
A successful transaction is indicated by turning on a light-emitting diode (LED) which is built into
the NodeMCU itself. The LED is turned off at the beginning of the transaction building process.
When the transaction is sent and a positive response was received, the LED is turned on again until
the generation of the next transaction. This gives a visual feedback, even if no computer monitoring
the serial output is connected.
For measuring the duration of single algorithm steps, a flag can be commented in. If present, the
“TIMING” flag performs timing measurements and puts the results out on the serial monitor.
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The code execution starts as soon as the MCU is provided with power, either over a USB port or
directly over a power socket. An UML flow chart for the order of MCU operations in given in
Figure 4.3.
Instead of building transactions with a fixed cycle time, the creation could easily be triggered on
specific events. For example, an external switch could trigger the transaction creation each time it is
pressed. Or obtained sensor data could trigger creating a transaction, e.g. when a certain threshold
brightness value is surpassed. Such external conditions would only require slight changes in the
MCU’s programming code.
config.h
The configuration header file contains constants and parameters for the configuration of the MCU.
Some of them may be changed by the user, others should stay as they are. An overview on the
different parameters is given in the following. Table 4.1 shows the configuration parameters that
should not be changed in order for the program to work properly.
Table 4.1: Configuration parameters for the microcontroller code that should not be changed
Parameter Name Type Description
GET_NONCE String Has the value “eth_getTransactionCount”, which is the
Etherscan API GET function to retrieve an account’s nonce.
SEND_TRANSACTION String Has the value “eth_sendRawTransaction”, which is the
Etherscan API GET function for sending a signed transac-
tion.
HTTP_HOST String Has the value “api-ropsten.etherscan.io”, the Etherscan
domain where the HTTPS requests are sent to.
API_KEY String The API key which has to be sent with every HTTP request
to the Etherscan server.
HTTPS_PORT Integer Port where the HTTP requests are sent to. Has the value
443 for the server’s HTTPS port.
HTTPS_FINGERPRINT String SHA-1 hash of the server’s TLS certificate. Can be checked
with every request if necessary.
Table 4.2 lists parameters that may be changed by the user, e.g. for using another account or
specifying the WiFi to which the MCU connects to.
In Table 4.3, the parameters defining static transaction data are given.
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Figure 4.3: UML flow chart for code execution on the microcontroller
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Table 4.2: Configuration parameters for the microcontroller code that may be adapted by a user
Parameter Name Type Description
PRIVATE_KEY String The Ethereum account’s private key used to sign transac-
tions.
PRIVATE_KEY
_LENGTH
Integer Length of the account’s private key in hexadecimal digits,
which is 64.
PUBLIC_KEY String The Ethereum account’s public key. Can be used for
signature verification.
PUBLIC_KEY
_LENGTH
Integer Length of the account’s public key in hexadecimal digits,
which is 128.
ACCOUNT_ADDRESS String 40 hexadecimal digits long address of the account, prefixed
with “0x”.
WIFI String ID of the WiFi that the MCU connects to upon start up.
PASSWORD String Password of the WiFi network that the MCU connects to.
WAIT_BETWEEN
_TRANSACTIONS_MS
Integer Duration between end of one transaction and the start of
the next one in milliseconds.
MAXIMUM_AMOUNT
_TRANSACTIONS
Integer Maximum number of transactions that the MCU should
issue in one session.
Table 4.3: Transaction specific configuration parameters for the microcontroller code
Parameter Name Type Description
CHAIN_ID String Hex prefixed string for the used chain. Set to “0x03” for
the Ropsten test net.
GAS_PRICE String Hex prefixed string for the price per used gas of the trans-
action in wei. Set to “0x3b9aca00” for 1 gwei.
GAS_LIMIT String Hex prefixed string for the maximum amount of gas that the
transaction may consume. Set to “0x186a0” for 100000.
RECEIVING
_ADDRESS
String Hex prefixed address of the transaction receiver. Can either
be an EOA or a smart contract.
TRANSACTION_DATA String Hex prefixed string of the transaction data. Can be filled
with placeholders that get their values at execution time.
REC_ID_FALSE String Hex prefixed string for the recovery parameter of the current
blockchain instance if the bit is 0. For Ropsten test net:
“0x29”
REC_ID_TRUE String Hex prefixed string for the recovery parameter of the current
blockchain instance if the bit is 1. For Ropsten test net:
“0x2a”
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The blockchain technology as a whole is a relatively new concept and its complete potential as well
as risks are not yet fully investigated. In this section, we take a closer look at possible attacks on
blockchains and also design a metric to estimate how secure it is that a transaction will actually be
stored immutably in a distributed ledger.
5.1 Possible Attacks on Blockchains
One of the main features that most blockchains share is being distributed. This also changes the
way that attacks on them are performed. Attacking a blockchain immensely differs from attacking a
single centralized server. One corrupt node in the P2P network is highly unlikely to do any harm.
There are two different main goals that an attacker wants to achieve [CKLR17]: an attacker wants
to either shut down the blockchain P2P network, i.e. prevent successfully sending transactions and
mining new blocks, or perform transactions that favor the attacker in some way.
Many of the attacks are described to theoretically and also practically work on the Bitcoin
blockchain, as it is the oldest and best known blockchain implementation. Nonetheless, the same
attack mechanisms work on various other blockchain implementations with similar underlying
concepts.
Double-Spending Attack
The term double-spending attack refers to all kinds of different attacks that allow a malicious user
to spend the same token multiple times [KAC12]. The basic setup is always the following: an
attacker sends two transactions that only differ in the receiver’s address shortly after another. The
first one transfers tokens to the address of the victim. This could e.g. be an online shop which
accepts payments done in a cryptocurrency. The second, slightly later issued transaction goes to an
address in control of the attacker. Only one of the two transactions will then be put into a block.
The attacker’s goal is to trick the victim into thinking that it was the recipient of the transaction,
while the transaction that actually gets included into a block is the one favoring the attacker.
Such an attack works if the receiver is not waiting for the transaction to be put into a block, or if the
transaction is put into a block which is later abandoned due to a previously happened fork. A fork
describes the event that multiple instances of a valid blockchain exist, i.e. two or more different
blocks have the same height [Ant14]. Such an event can either occur on purpose or accidentally.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of a successful double-spending attack
Purposeful forks happen e.g. when the blockchain protocol gets updated. This can result in
transactions following the old protocol no longer being accepted by nodes which implement the
new protocol. On the other hand, nodes running the old protocol will still accept such transactions.
That way, two different blockchain instances exist in parallel which are both valid according to their
respective protocols.
At an accidental fork, two or more miners find a valid block at almost the same time. Multiple
blocks contain a different set of transactions, but they are all valid blocks. Multiple chains are valid
at this point and subsequent blocks get added to them. Over time, one chain will eventually grow
faster than the other ones, resulting in the shorter chains to be abandoned.
If the transaction favoring the attacker is on the chain that will henceforth be considered the valid
chain, and the transaction to the victim is in a block of the abandoned chain, the attack can be
successful. A schematic for a successful double-spending attack with the help of a blockchain fork
is given in Figure 5.1.
51% Attack
This potential scenario can occur when a group of miners holds more than 50% of the global mining
power [KDF13]. Mining cryptocurrencies is often organized in pools. In such a pool, users solve
the PoW puzzle together and split the reward proportional to each user’s provided calculation power.
That way, it is not unlikely for a single pool to contribute a large amount to the global mining
power.
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If a single group of miners would possess more than half of the global mining power, this group
could decide what the blockchain’s status is at any time. They could perform double-spending
attacks, reject blocks or revert already confirmed transactions. The root cause for the possibility of
such an attack lies in the consensus algorithm used in many blockchain implementations. As there
is no central authority supervising the status of the blockchain, it is always the majority of hashing
power deciding over it.
Routing Attack
Such an attack targets the route of IP packets in the Internet [AZV17]. An attacker tries to attract
all the traffic that was destined to a certain IP prefix. This is possible due to the routing protocol
BGP which is used to transport IP packets. Routers are offered a route along which they can send
their packets, and the validity of the route does not get checked. If an attacker can trick a router
into sending packets to a different receiver than intended, the attacker can either drop or reroute the
packets.
In the Bitcoin blockchain for example, the P2P network operates as follows: after a network node is
started, it first needs to find peers to connect to. This is achieved by issuing DNS requests to static
host names which then return a list of active peers in the network. If this is not successful, there
is also the possibility to communicate with nodes via hard coded IP addresses. If a connection is
established, a node can query the addresses of peers that the other node is connected to [Bit18b].
The goal of an attacker is to create a partition of the P2P network. One set of nodes should be
running on IP addresses hosted by IP prefixes under the attacker’s control. The other set of nodes
runs normally. If nodes have a communication crossing the boundary of the two sets, the attacker
can just drop all the packets and thereby isolate one set from the other. Node traffic within the set
that the attacker forged can be monitored.
The result of such an attack is that some nodes get different information about the blockchain’s
status than others. Depending on the size and constellation of the isolated nodes, such a routing
attack can facilitate other attacks like the previously described double-spending attack. It can also
be seen as a denial of service attack, because nodes are being disconnected from the majority of the
network and computational power is wasted.
5.2 Degree of Trust Measurement
In the following, an approach to measure the degree of trust that data is durably stored in the
blockchain will be developed. The considerations apply to public, decentralized blockchains using
a PoW consensus algorithm.
The term “finality” of a transaction describes a state when it is mathematically highly unlikely that
a transaction will be changed or abandoned. If a transaction was already successfully put into a
block, measuring the degree of trust is rather simple. It suffices to count confirmations, i.e. the
number of blocks that were appended to the blockchain after the block containing the observed
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transaction. The more confirmations a block has, the more likely it is that it is not on a blockchain
branch that will be abandoned. For each blockchain implementation, there can be defined a number
of confirmations that make a transaction final under certain prerequisites. In the Bitcoin blockchain,
which is the most prominent PoW blockchain implementation, the chances of an attacker reverting
a transaction are as follows [Nak08]:
P(X = success) = 1 −
z∑
k=0
λk · e−λ
k!
(
1 − (q/p)z−k
)
z is the amount of blocks to be reverted,
p the probability of an honest node finding the next block,
q the probability of an attacker finding the next block,
λ =
z ·q
p .
This formula shows that if an attacker tried to create a longer, valid Bitcoin chain, the chances for
success would be rather low, especially when the attacker has to catch up several blocks. When
assuming that 11 blocks have to be reverted and the attacker possessed 20% of the global hash rate,
a success occurs with a chance of less than 0.1% [Nak08].
In order to avoid getting wrong information from a corrupt or isolated node, it is recommended to
check the confirmations for a specific block by querying different nodes.
As it is now clear how the chance for finality of transactions already contained in a block is measured,
another aspect can be focused: can the degree of trust be estimated before a transaction is even part
of a block?
5.2.1 Possible Parameters
Before an approach can be designed to measure the degree of trust for unconfirmed transactions,
one has to identify parameters that enable an estimation.
Each of the following parameters is best accessible when running multiple blockchain nodes which
can then be monitored. It is not required to have access to all existing nodes, but rather to a certain
percentage of total nodes. The values for the whole network can then be extrapolated from the data
that is known.
Number of Total Nodes
As we have seen that nodes can be attacked or isolated, a big P2P network creates more security.
The more nodes participate, the less likely it is to do severe damage to the network. Therefore, the
overall amount of active nodes plays a role in estimating the security.
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Number of Nodes Aware of the Transaction
Of course, it does not help a transaction to be issued if the network only has a lot of participants.
The nodes must also be aware that a transaction is pending. The more nodes know of the pending
transaction, the more likely it is that a miner picks the transaction and puts it into a block. Therefore,
if the pending transaction is spread over many nodes, it is less likely to get lost or be canceled.
Transaction Fee
Each miner can freely choose which transactions to put into the next block and which not. Though,
a miner is usually willing to maximize the profit, i.e. the transactions offering high fees will be put
into a block first. That is why a high fee increases the chance of a transaction being in the next
block that is mined.
Relative Transaction Fee
Nevertheless, the amount of fee paid alone is not a good estimator. If all pending transactions
offer a fee that is considered unusually high, it does not favor any of them. The fee has to be
high relative to the fee of other competing transactions. One could think of a table containing all
the unconfirmed transactions ranked by the fee that is paid in descending order. The higher the
considered transaction’s rank in such a table is, the more likely it is to succeed within a short time.
Total Amount of Incoming Transactions
The amount of overall transactions that are issued on a blockchain within a certain period of time is
also relevant for the success of the observed transaction. Yet, the pure rate of transaction arrival
does not give anything away about the overall performance.
Transaction Throughput of the Blockchain
Many blockchains have a certain average time between the finding of two blocks. Also, the amount
of transactions that can be put into a block is limited. It can either be a fixed value (which makes
sense if the size of transactions is always the same and cannot be enlarged by the sender) or dynamic,
i.e. depending on the different sizes of all contained transactions. One way or the other, statistics
can be generated estimating how many transactions are executed in a certain period of time. The
higher the general transaction throughput is in relation to the overall incoming transactions, the
higher the probability for a fast execution.
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5.2.2 Designing a Metric
As already discussed, the number of nodes alone does not give away anything about how secure
one can be that a transaction succeeds. The same goes for the number of nodes that are aware of
the transaction. What is an important factor though, is the ratio of these two values. This can be
expressed with:
c1 =
Naware
Ntotal
,
with Ntotal being the amount of active P2P nodes and Naware being the amount of nodes that have
the targeted transaction in their unconfirmed transaction pool. The resulting value is in the interval
[0,1]. The higher this value, i.e. the higher the ratio between nodes aware of the transaction and
total nodes, the more likely the transaction will be executed.
A further component of a metric can consider the transaction fee. Let R be the rank of a transaction
in a table of pending transactions as described in Section 5.2.1. The following estimator can then be
calculated:
c2 =
1
R
This gives a value in the range [0,1], with a high rank, i.e. a low numerical value, resulting in a high
c2 value.
The last component results form the blockchain’s throughput. Let t be the average time between
the finding of two blocks in seconds and a the average amount of transactions in a block. The
transaction throughput can then be calculated by at [transactions/second]. Furthermore, let λ be
the rate of newly arriving transactions to the network in transactions per second. A metric value
can now be calculated by at ·λ . The result is in the interval [0,∞[. A value over 1 means that more
transactions are being executed than issued, which guarantees that each transaction will be part of
the next block. As a value bigger than 1 should not have an effect, the result is:
c3 =

a
t ·λ for
a
t ·λ < 1
1 for at ·λ ≥ 1
Once again, a high value means that many of the pending transactions are executed, thus increasing
the chance of a certain transaction to be executed.
Simply adding the three values c1, c2 and c3 would not result in a good metric. There could be an
extremely high throughput and an immense fee paid, but only one isolated node is aware of the
transaction. In such a case, adding the single values would result in a relatively high overall value
(2 out of a maximum of 3), but the transaction would probably never get executed. The same goes
for extremely bad c2 and c3 values.
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To overcome this issue, we additionally introduce positive weights wi for each of the parameters.
The sum of the parameters multiplied with their respective weights divided by the sum of weights
gives us an overall estimator.
C =
3∑
i=1
ci · wi
3∑
i=1
wi
=
c1 · w1 + c2 · w2 + c3 · w3
w1 + w2 + w3
=
Naware ·w1
Ntot al
+
w2
R + c3 · w3
w1 + w2 + w3
with
w1, w2, w3 ∈ R ≥ 0 =̂ Positive weights for each parameter free to choose,
Naware =̂ Number of active nodes that have the transaction in their pending transactions pool,
Ntotal =̂ Number of active nodes in the P2P network,
R =̂ Rank of the transaction in the table of pending transactions, ordered descending by fee paid,
c3 = at ·λ or maximum 1,
t =̂ Average time between the creation of two consecutive blocks,
a =̂ Average amount of transactions in a block,
λ =̂ Rate of newly arriving transactions to the network.
Note that C does not have a unit and will always be in the range [0,1]. A high value indicates a high
probability for the transaction to be executed, a low value stands for a low probability.
The weights can be chosen freely, and it is recommended to perform multiple calculations with
many different weights in order to get a good estimate.
With the formula that was built up here, the chances for transaction finality can be estimated.
Different aspects influencing the chance of a transaction being executed in PoW blockchains are
taken into account. By weighting and combining the single estimators, one overall estimator was
found.
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6 Evaluation
This chapter evaluates the prototypical implementation and thereby also the designed concept.
Additionally, the requirements that were imposed on the design are checked against the prototype.
6.1 Evaluation of the Implementation
In order to evaluate the practicality of the prototype and the idea of immutably stored data, it is
not enough to just successfully send transactions to the blockchain. While it is correct that the
data inside a transaction becomes a part of the immutable ledger, it does not make much sense for
production data to be distributed in an unstructured manner over multiple single transactions. What
we want to achieve is storing the data at one easily accessible place in the blockchain. This can be
done with the help of an Ethereum smart contract.
6.1.1 Smart Contract
For the evaluation of the prototypical implementation, a smart contract was deployed into Ethereum’s
Ropsten test net. The smart contract is written in the programming language Solidity and the code
can be seen in Listing 6.1.
The name of the shown smart contract is “NodeMCU_Endpoint” (line 5). It defines dataBlocks
(line 8) consisting of an Ethereum address and an unsigned 16 bit integer. A dynamic array of
dataBlocks named valueArray is declared (line 17) which allows for appending new dataBlocks after
the contract’s initial deployment. Additionally, the contract stores the address of its creator (line
14). This is done in the constructor which has the same name as the contract (line 29). When the
contract is deployed, the constructor is called automatically once and can never be called again for
this contract. In the constructor, the deploying address gets stored within a variable of the contract.
Together with the modifier onlyOwner (line 20), functions can be restricted to be called only by the
contract creator.
The contract offers two functions and one event. The first public function is called Send_Data (line
35) and can only be called by the contract creator’s address. As a parameter, an unsigned 16 bit
integer has to be given. If the size of the parameter is smaller than 1024, the value is stored in a
newly generated dataBlock together with the sender’s address. Then, the dataBlock gets appended
to the array of publicly visible dataBlocks. The idea behind this function is that the MCU can
send its measured values to the blockchain and they all get stored in an array chronologically. The
restriction of sensor values to the range 0 ≤ value ≤ 1024 is done to filter unexpected sensor data
out. The restriction to only one valid sender address creates additional security. This is done by
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Listing 6.1 Smart contract code for storage of sensor data
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.19;
2
3 // This contract receives values from 0-1024 from the contract creator and stores them
4 // in a dynamic array together with the senders address.
5 contract NodeMCU_Endpoint {
6
7 // Struct containing sender address and sensor value.
8 struct dataBlock {
9 address sender;
10 uint16 value;
11 }
12
13 // Address of the contract creator. Only the creator is allowed to send values.
14 address private creator;
15
16 // Dynamic array of dataBlocks
17 dataBlock[] public valueArray;
18
19 // Modifier allowing only the contract creator to call a function.
20 modifier onlyOwner() {
21 require(msg.sender == creator);
22 _;
23 }
24
25 // Create event log for each sent value.
26 event OnSendData(address sender, uint16 sentValue);
27
28 // Constructor defining the contract creator.
29 function NodeMCU_Endpoint() public {
30 creator = msg.sender;
31 }
32
33 // Allows the contract creator to send a sensor value in the range 0-1024.
34 // The value gets stored in a data block together with contract creator's address.
35 function Send_Data(uint16 amount) public onlyOwner {
36 if (amount > 1024) return;
37 valueArray.push(dataBlock({
38 sender: msg.sender,
39 value: amount
40 }));
41 OnSendData(msg.sender, amount);
42 }
43
44 // Returns the latest sensor value that was stored.
45 function Get_Last_Value() public view returns (uint16) {
46 if (valueArray.length == 0) return;
47 return valueArray[valueArray.length - 1].value;
48 }
49 }
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giving the Send_Data function the previously defined onlyOwner modifier. In order to manipulate
data in the smart contract, an attacker has to know the private key of the account stored on the MCU
and issue transactions in its name.
When a dataBlock was successfully appended to the array, a previously defined event (line 26) is
triggered. This event is appended to a log containing all the events of the smart contract. It facilitates
debugging and gives a quick overview on all Send_Data function calls and their corresponding
transactions together with age and block height.
The second function of the smart contract is called Get_Last_Value (line 45) and can be called by
anyone. It returns the last value that was added to the array, if existent.
During its deployment, the smart contract is assigned an address which is calculated once again
via RLP encoding, hashing and cutting the leftmost bytes away. The address of the presented
contract is “0x5e2a561439602495e2DDdF0Ed59f247A6CE01E23” 5. In the MCU’s config, the
RECEIVING_ADDRESS parameter has to be set to this address. In order to send valid transactions
to the contract, it is not necessary to send any funds along with the transaction, which is why the
transaction’s “value” field can be left empty. What is important for a function call though is the
transaction’s data field. It has to contain an encoding of the contract’s desired function as well as all
the required parameter values. The encoding works as follows [Sol18]:
Function Selector Encoding
The beginning of each transaction data field for calling smart contract functions has to consist of a 4
byte long encoding of the desired function. The 4 bytes are obtained by taking the four leftmost
bytes of the Keccak-256 hash of the function’s signature. The signature contains the name of the
function as well as the types of each of its arguments separated with commas and written inside
parentheses. As no function with the same name and same list of arguments can appear twice in the
same smart contract, this encoding gives an unambiguous identifier. The IDs for the functions of
the smart contract given in Listing 6.1 are:
Encoding(Send_Data(uint16)) = “0dbd5e81”
Encoding(Get_Last_Value()) = “29bee342”
Encoding(valueArray(uint256)) = “858090d5”
Though valueArray is not a function, Soliditiy automatically generates getter functions for all public
variables. The unsigned 256 bit integer is used here to index the array.
5The smart contract can be accessed via Etherscan under the following link: https://ropsten.etherscan.io/
address/0x5e2a561439602495e2dddf0ed59f247a6ce01e23
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Figure 6.1: Serial output of the setup phase
Encoding of the Arguments
Not only the function which is to be called must be encoded, but also its parameters. All elementary
types like integers, boolean values or addresses are encoded as 32 byte long hexadecimal values,
padded with zeros on the left. More complex types are not needed in the exemplary smart contract
and are therefore omitted here.
The integer value 123 for example would first be transformed in a hexadecimal value, resulting in
0x7b. The padded argument that is appended to the function selector would then be:
“000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007b”.
Serial Output
The concatenation of the function selector and the encoding of all arguments gives the required data
field of the transaction. TheMCUconfig therefore has to bemodified so that TRANSACTION_DATA
consists of the function selector encoding followed by a dummy which is replaced with the current
sensor value at runtime.
The prototype is now able to not only issue basic transactions, but also transactions that enable
an interaction with smart contracts. This allows for the storage and possibly further processing of
obtained measurement data.
The serial monitor output that is generated by the MCU after its power on is shown in Figure 6.1
and Figure 6.2.
As a first step seen in Figure 6.1, a WiFi connection is established. If this is successful, the MCU
sends an HTTPS request to retrieve the account’s current nonce. The JSON object shows that the
current nonce is 0x63. Everything that is executed here is part of the setup() function.
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Figure 6.2: Serial output of one loop iteration
Once the setup phase ends, the MCU starts to cyclically build and issue transactions. Figure 6.2
begins with outputting the obtained sensor value and subsequently creates an unsigned transaction
around it. The serial monitor shows the RLP encoding of the transaction and the Keccak-256 hash
of said encoding. This is followed by the signature generation algorithm, which has to be repeated
once on this case. As a next step, the signature values that were created are given as an output,
namely the recovery bit, r and s.
With all this information, the signed transaction can be built and once again the RLP encoding of
the now signed transaction can be done. The string of the final transaction is printed to the serial
output.
The last step is sending the transaction. We can see that the MCU is establishing an HTTPS
connection to the Etherscan API and sends an eth_sendRawTransaction request. If the response is
valid, the received JSON object is output on the serial monitor. The result string corresponds to the
transaction ID.
Now, the waiting period between two transactions begins, and when it is over, the next transaction
will be constructed and sent the same way.
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6.1.2 Code Execution Time Analysis
The time that the MCU requires in order to successfully issue a transaction is a crucial factor in the
evaluation of the design. If building a transaction takes too long and cannot be further accelerated,
the prototypical implementation and with it the whole concept fails. That is why an analysis of the
execution time for the program loop’s main functions was performed. The time that different steps
of the code execution take was measured for ten consecutive transactions. For each transaction, a
new sensor value was obtained and sent to the smart contract introduced in Section 6.1.1. Table 6.1
shows the results.
Table 6.1: Duration of the single steps in the transaction creation process in milliseconds
Step
Acquire Data and
Build Unsigned
Transaction RLP
Hash Sign Build
Signed
Transac-
tion RLP
Establish
Connection
to Server
Positive
Server
Re-
sponse
Total
9 10 731
(1 Trial)
41 453 391 1635
9 10 2064
(3 Trials)
41 465 323 2911
9 9 707
(1 Trial)
41 420 271 1457
8 10 716
(1 Trial)
41 438 359 1572
9 9 620
(1 Trial)
40 448 434 1560
8 10 3460
(5 Trials)
40 620 400 4538
9 10 3766
(5 Trials)
41 490 527 4843
8 10 617
(1 Trial)
40 462 296 1433
9 9 617
(1 Trial)
41 444 442 1562
8 10 620
(1 Trial)
41 477 518 1674
8.6 9.7 1391.8 40.7 471.7 396.1 2316.6
We see that obtaining a sensor value, putting it in an unsigned transaction and hashing said
transaction takes less than 20 milliseconds. The majority of time needed comes from the signature
generation. Each time that the ECDSA algorithm is executed takes 600-750 ms. As described
in Section 4.2, the hashing algorithm has to be repeated with a chance of 50%. This means that
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on average, the algorithm has to be performed twice. This takes roughly 1.4 seconds then. If the
algorithm should not produce a valid signature within ten trials, the transaction creation process
gets aborted and a new transaction will be generated. However, this happens in less than 1 out of
1000 transactions, see Section 4.2. If necessary, the limit of 10 transaction can also be increased.
The idea behind it is to limit the overall maximum execution time.
Constructing the signed transaction RLP takes longer than building the unsigned one, as all steps
have to be repeated, and additional ones have to be performed.
A timing component that can barely be influenced are the last two steps. Both establishing the
HTTPS connection to the server and receiving a positive response for a sent request depend heavily
on factors outside of the prototype’s reach. The server’s performance varies over time and also with
the amount of API users. Furthermore, the performance of the network that the MCU is connected
to influences the transmission times. Yet, after an average waiting time of 0.9 seconds, a connection
to the server was established and a valid response was received.
The last column, the overall time for issuing one transaction, is measured independently from the
single steps and may therefore not always be the sum of the six individual steps. It is the time from
the beginning until the end of one transaction sending loop iteration. The measured average value
for issuing a successful transaction was 2.3 seconds. The big deviation of some samples from the
mean arise mostly from the amount of signature generation repetitions.
6.2 Retrospect of Requirements
For a profound evaluation of both the chosen design and the resulting prototype, a comparison with
the requirements defined beforehand has to be made. Only if the important requirements are met by
the implementation, we have constructed a viable prototype.
Each requirement stated in Section 3.1 will briefly be repeated and its fulfillment is checked.
Functional Requirements
• Sending Data to the Blockchain X
The prototype is able to send its own transactions into the Ethereum blockchain. Therefore,
this requirement is met.
• Permanent Storage X
By sending transactions that are accepted by the Ethereum network, the data within these
transactions is permanently stored. In order to ameliorate the quality of the data storage, a
smart contract was deployed in the blockchain. This smart contract keeps track of all data that
was sent with the intention of storing it permanently. It also allows to access the collected
values in a structured, yet easy fashion.
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• Retrieving Blockchain Data X
Through the use of the remote node’s JSON-RPC, all kinds of data about the blockchain,
its individual blocks or general meta information can be retrieved. In the current prototype
implementation, the nonce of the sending account is queried each time the MCU powers up.
If the data field of the transaction gets adapted, the sensor values stored within the smart
contract’s array can be obtained again. Generally, every information that is accessible via the
JSON-RPC could potentially be retrieved by the MCU with the help of little adaptions.
• Minimize Time Between Transactions (10 seconds) X
An efficient way for building a valid transaction was found. On average, this task takes 2.3
seconds and is therefore much faster than the initially demanded 10 seconds. Even the worst
case execution time lies beyond the required limit.
• Real World Interaction X
With the brightness sensor, a means to interact with the real world was implemented. This
light value could be measured in the surrounding of a production machine or come from the
machine itself. By encapsulating the data collection into an own component, it can also be
interchanged with another component measuring different data. With the MCU supporting a
variety of analog interfaces, a direct communication with a production machine could also
easily be implemented.
Functional Requirements
• Minimize Security Risks X
The presented design minimizes risks for the integrity of obtained sensor data. Once the
measured value leaves the MCU, it is already put into a signed transaction, prohibiting an
attacker to change data without the signature becoming invalid. That way, only valid data
gets immutably stored, which was one of the main motivations for this work. The MCU is
programmed only for this single and special purpose and opens no unnecessary attack vectors
to the outside. Even if the receiving Ethereum node was corrupt, it would still not be possible
to store manipulated data in the name of the honest sender.
• Measure Degree of Trust X
In addition to developing a concept and implementing it, a way of measuring the certainty
that a transaction will become part of a block was to be found. This was done by discussing
and defining a metric that takes into account different factors directly or indirectly influencing
the probability for the success of a transaction.
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General Requirements
• Use Appropriate Blockchain Implementation X
The used blockchain implementation, Ethereum, has allowed for the fulfillment of all
requirements that were initially demanded. After a discussion of the most promising
platforms, Ethereum was chosen because of the generality of its design. Through the
existence of many similar blockchain implementations, the basic concepts can be adapted
and prototypes for other blockchains can be implemented following this design.
• Hardware-near Implementation X
The implementation was done on a MCU, enabling both the interaction with the real world
and the blockchain.
• Direct Sensor Connection X
With the chosen MCU board, the NodeMCU, sensor data can directly be obtained without an
intermediary. This is currently done for a brightness value. In the future, more sophisticated
protocols for the interaction with actual production machines can be realized based on this
prototype.
6.3 Conclusion
The presented design along with its prototypical implementation meets all the requirements that
were posed to it. The performed proof of concept allows machines or sensors an easy and yet
secure connection to a blockchain. The only prerequisite is a WiFi access point. Running an own
blockchain node will likely improve the performance by speeding up the HTTPS calls, but it is not
required. The low price of the MCU makes it a viable candidate for substituting gateway solutions
running on general purpose computers. Additionally, the design increases the integrity of the
production data. Instead of being sent from the machine to a gateway computer and being signed
there, the transaction gets directly signed on the MCU itself. Furthermore, the MCU can also issue
the transaction, making it difficult to alter any measured value once it left the MCU, as the signature
then gets invalid. Transactions with invalid signatures are rejected by the receiving Ethereum node,
preventing manipulated data from getting stored.
As already mentioned, using a blockchain as a data storage for production data only makes sense if
the integrity of the immutably stored data is given. The presented design is a big step towards this
goal.
Also, the transaction generation is fast and enables the transmission of data in a brief cycle time.
Other models apart from the cyclic issuance of transactions can also be implemented easily. One
exemplary scenario could be sending a transaction to indicate that a certain threshold was surpassed.
As the MCU can also process the real world events that it measures, it could issue such a transaction
and additionally operate actuators, e.g. to shut down the production machine.
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7 Summary & Future Work
This chapter briefly wraps up the results of the work and gives an outlook on possible future work
resulting from the developed concept.
7.1 Summary
In this thesis, an approach to enable communication with a blockchain apart from using a general
purpose computer as a gateway was designed. By making it possible for a machine to post
transactions with the help of a more primitive hardware, security risks can be reduced. Machine
data that has to keep its integrity is no longer sent to a blockchain node or a gateway computer before
being part of a signed transaction. Instead, the developed MCU is building signed transactions
directly after obtaining data. Once a signed transaction is sent to a blockchain node, the measured
data within it can no longer be altered without the transaction becoming invalid, resulting in its
rejection by the network.
As a first step, this work presented the blockchain technology itself as well as different existing
implementations of it. The usage of blockchains for industrial applications was described as well as
problems resulting from current gateway solutions.
Afterwards, requirements for a concept overcoming the identified problems were introduced. Based
on these requirements, a concept for a different way of blockchain interaction was developed. As a
blockchain implementation, the Ethereum test net Ropsten was chosen. The MCU of choice for the
developed prototype was the NodeMCU. A possible concept as well as the subsequent steps for
generating a valid Ethereum transaction were investigated. This resulted in the development of two
different system architecture approaches, of which the one giving more security was chosen.
The single components of the prototypical implementation and their collaboration were then
presented. The different possibilities for configuring the MCU were explained and an overview
on the steps of code execution was given. The modular design allows for the exchange of single
components.
Apart from concept and implementation, there was another focus laid on blockchain security aspects.
Therefore, different attacks on blockchains were presented. Parameters for estimating how certain it
is for a transaction to be successful were identified and a metric including such parameters was
developed step by step.
For the evaluation of the design and the prototype, a smart contract collecting and storing sensor
values was deployed. This showed how data sent from the prototype can indeed be stored and
accessed in a useful way. Thereby, the concept got validated as well. In order to further substantiate
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the practicality of the developed prototype, a timing measurement was performed. The result of this
measurement was a mean time between two transactions of roughly 2.3 seconds. Additionally, the
different aspects leading to this overall execution time were discussed.
The prototypical implementation in combination with the smart contract receiving and storing the
single measured values prove that the design is fulfilling its intended goal: measured data can be
durably stored in a blockchain while at the same time the risk of tampered data becoming part of a
transaction is reduced.
It is not even necessary to run an own blockchain node. The developed prototype can be operated
anywhere, as long as it has access to a WiFi. By changing few of the configuration parameters, the
transactions can be sent to any Ethereum network instance, not only the Ropsten test net.
Additionally, an approach to measure the degree of trust that transactions are indeed durably stored
within a blockchain was suggested. Therefore, different possible parameters influencing the chances
of a transaction being added into a block were discussed. It was also shown how transaction finality
is estimated in the Bitcoin network mathematically. Resulting from this discussion, a metric was
developed to estimate how likely it is for a transaction to succeed for any PoW-based blockchain
implementation.
All the requirements that were posed prior to the design were met. This comprises the general
requirements as well as functional and non-functional requirements for the concept and its
implementation.
7.2 Future Work
As this work is only the beginning of research with MCUs for blockchain communication, many
further aspects can be investigated in the future.
By interchanging the data collection component of the design, different interfaces for different
machines could be implemented. As the MCU supports multiple serial interfaces, such an adaption
could be made for various kinds of targeted machines.
As a proof of concept, it was enough to show that the proposed design works for public Ethereum
instances. As a next step, one could investigate private instances that are not accessible by anyone.
If sensitive production data is to be stored, only trustworthy parties should be able to read and write
it. Therefore, setting up such a private network and configuring an own node for JSON-RPC access
is required.
It would also be interesting to change the blockchain implementation specific components of the
design in order to send transactions to other blockchains apart from Ethereum. Therefore, the
transaction building detail of another implementation has to be investigated and implemented on
the MCU. As the client component sends regular HTTP(S) calls, the endpoint of such a call does
not have to be a JSON-RPC. Any interface accepting HTTP(S) calls is sufficient.
Also, working together with companies testing the design in a real production environment could
help with finding further possible improvements.
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7.2 Future Work
The data necessary to check the quality of the designed transaction trust metric is not easily
obtainable. This makes an evaluation for the metric rather difficult. In the future, the proposed
ways of getting data to verify the metric could be tested. The metric could then be further refined or
additional parameters could be found an added to the calculation.
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